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Executive summary 
 
 
Although land restitution and redistribution concern redress, social justice and 
reconciliation, many would consider that these objectives will never be achieved if no 
development occurs on the acquired lands. Development has many dimensions 
(especially if considered as a means of addressing the injustices of the past) among 
which the improvement of low income and low consumption are only a couple. 
Improving quality of life in general, addressing insecurity, powerlessness and low 
self-esteem, overcrowded homes and alienation from the community, etc. are as 
important. Such a broad definition of development finds a striking illustration in the 
case of South Africa, where no famine is observed and where social and welfare 
grants often guarantee a minimum livelihood at household level.  
 
After ten years of land restitution and redistribution in South Africa, the extent to 
which the land restitution programme has effectively and sustainably improved 
people’s lives in South Africa must be investigated. The objective of this paper is to 
have a closer look at current restitution and redistribution projects, to understand their 
effective implementation in the field, from the initial application phase to the final 
configuration of the project, in order to identify lacks, threats and problems affecting 
the projects. Recommendations are then made to link the restitution and redistribution 
of land to development. 
 
Based on a broad empirical survey, the paper evaluates South Africa’s land reform 
programmes. It details more particularly findings regarding the restitution and 
redistribution projects of the Mole-mole municipality in the Limpopo Province. 
Retaining the broad definition of development provided above, the paper focuses on 
socio-economic factors affecting rural (often more farm-oriented) but also urban 
projects (more housing oriented). Questionnaires at project level and at household 
level1 have shown that - at least in Mole-mole case - restitution has not significantly 
changed the socio-economic aspects of the majority of beneficiaries’ lives. Of the 39 
land reform projects assessed, four projects seem likely to survive, though only three 
in a sustainable manner. With only 0.4% of the official beneficiaries benefiting 
effectively from the projects, even fewer can be projected to be experiencing 
improvement in quality of life. 
 
Several main reasons explain these failures. Firstly, the feasibility of the land reform 
projects is questionable due to difficult economic conditions and isolation. Secondly, 
inappropriate institutional structures at project level lead to legal disparities, 
inappropriate power structures, important intra-community conflicts, as well as 
mismanagement and misuse of resources. Thirdly, a lack of collective action and 
institutional contact leads to institutional isolation. Finally, land reform processes are 
plagued by administrative complexity, ignorant and unskilled personnel and a lack of 
transparency, leading to extreme delays, the collapse of projects, powerlessness, and 
an overall lack of adapted and coordinated services to land reform projects. 
 
                                                 
1
 Household surveys were needed to depict the beneficiaries trajectories, necessary to assess the 
evolution of the quality of life 
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The recommendations of this paper mainly concern pre- and post-institutional issues. 
The paper suggests developing specific adapted institutional structures at project level 
to better satisfy the needs of beneficiaries. It also proposes enhancing collective action 
to avoid institutional isolation, as well as building a strong coherent umbrella 
structure, which includes control and monitoring systems, to integrate land reform 
projects into a transparent and coordinated - yet flexible - institutional framework. 
These recommendations are not all inclusive, but highlight some aspects to be 
addressed if redistribution, restitution and land reform in general are to succeed in the 
context of development. Above all, this paper shows that the needs of land reform 
projects are not uniform, implying that policy needs to create more transparent and 
participative procedures involving all concerned parties. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
1. Land reform in South Africa: addressing the inequalities 
of the past 
 
At the first conference on land redistribution in South Africa, held in Johannesburg in 
1993, Cyril Ramaphosa, the then secretary general of the ANC, noted that South 
Africa is not unique in its unequal land distribution but rather in the policy measures 
that have led to this situation (ANC, 1993). In contrast to most other countries with 
unequal land distribution, South Africa has a history of specific racial policies with 
clear implications for land distribution and ownership. This heritage of inequality was 
formalised with the implementation of the two Natives Land Acts of 1913 and 1936. 
The first act gave only 8% and the second only 13% of South Africa’s territory to 
non-whites, who at the time represented about 90% of the country’s population. This 
legislation further confined the coloured population to reserves and the black 
population to bantustans, where land tenure was insecure and farming practices 
mainly communal. Other measures restricted land tenancy or sharecropping 
possibilities for black and coloured populations living on land owned by white 
farmers, which in effect suffocated the (commercial) farming activities of these non-
white farmers and prompted an exodus to the reserves and bantustans. The result of 
these policies was the acquisition of land by whites and the elimination of the black 
peasantry, who then provided cheap adult male labour for the commercial farming, 
industry and mining sectors (Van Onselen, 1996).  
 
Such spatial segregation measures caused extreme inequality in land distribution in 
South Africa. Combined with legal limitation of commercial farming activities by 
black farmers, this land distribution inequality led to important inequalities between 
white and black farmers. In 1994, when the first democratic elections were held in 
South Africa, about 60,000 white farmers occupied 87 million hectares (ha) of 
privately owned land. These commercial farms contributed about 95% of South-
Africa’s total agricultural production (World Bank, 1994) and assured that the country 
was self-sufficient in most agricultural products. These farms employed between 
750,000 and one million farm workers (SSA, 2000). In contrast, 14 million blacks, 
gathered in the former bantustans and reserves, shared only 13% of South Africa’s 
area, i.e. 13 million ha (Department of Agriculture, 1995). The large majority of these 
people were engaged in one way or another in small-scale farming activities, mainly 
for subsistence.2 Their farming production only represented 16% of their food needs. 
According to the Southern African Department of the World Bank (World Bank, 
1994), though about 13% of the farming households had commercialised part of their 
production, only 0.2% of the households could effectively make a living through 
farming. One third of the rural households were estimated to have no access to land. 
 
                                                 
1
 The Department of Agriculture estimates the number of non-white farming households at 2 000 000. 
Nevertheless, these estimations have to be taken carefully as the definition of a farming household is 
not well developed and not precise. 
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Land reform was one of the principal promises made by the ANC at its ascension to 
power in 1994. One of the reasons for the launching of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) was that land reform was necessary to redress the 
injustices caused by forced deportation and restricted access to land (ANC, 1994). 
Aiming to solve overpopulation in certain rural areas of the former reserves and 
bantustans and to promote access to residential and farm land, this land reform was 
the centrepiece of the government’s strategy for Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR strategy). This strategy was built on the assumption that the 
land reform process in South Africa is not only a decisive element of the country’s 
ideological transition, but also a necessary condition for the political, economic and 
social stabilisation of the country. Therefore the ANC aimed to redistribute 30% of 
the country’s land during the first five years of its rule. This of course required the 
implementation of adapted economic policies (Department of Agriculture, 1995). 
 
 
1.1. South African economic policy and the different 
instruments of land reform 
 
South Africa’s first democratic elections, held in 1994, had profound economic 
consequences. Indeed, one of the decisions reached during the negotiations that ended 
the apartheid era was that political liberalisation should be accompanied by economic 
liberalisation. This has led to the implementation of economic policies advocating the 
reduction of the role of the State and redistribution through economic growth (Habib 
and Padayachee, 1999). The liberalisation of South Africa’s economy would enhance, 
according to the World Bank (World Bank, 1994) and the ANC (ANC, 1994), the 
economic system’s efficiency and would ensure more equal access to markets and 
services. 
 
In the agricultural sector, economic liberalisation implies agrarian and land reform 
carried out within the framework of a free market3, avoiding any form of 
expropriation. This market-led approach, opposed to state intervention (Borras, 2003), 
emphasises land reform to be implemented according to the “willing buyer-willing 
seller” principle (Department of Agriculture, 1995). This principle, which takes into 
account the rights of the present owners, is officially transcribed in the new 
Constitution, under the “property clause”. Officially, redistribution that increases the 
previously disadvantaged population’s access to land, agriculture and particularly 
commercial agriculture is presently promoted, but transactions should take place at 
market price. This market-led reform strategy was chosen, according to the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Land Affairs, to maintain the nation’s productive capacities, and so 
help ensure its economic stability, without neglecting the demands of equity. In 
addition, this approach is also low-cost, easy to implement and, most of all, supported 
by international organisations (in particular the World Bank) and is conducive to 
investor confidence. 
 
                                                 
3
 This included abolishing direct subsidies benefiting white farmers, suppressing unfair systems of 
agricultural marketing and transforming most of the institutions concerned with farm development (co-
operatives, financial services, etc.). 
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This said, the ANC and other stakeholders, taking into account South Africa’s history 
of land appropriation, the 1994 levels of protection and subsidy for white farmers and 
the poverty of the majority of the black populations, agreed that total liberalisation of 
the agricultural sector would not erase the land and agrarian inequalities inherited 
from apartheid. Accordingly a provision for State intervention was made to allow the 
possibilities of manoeuvring within the liberal economic framework. State 
intervention has been applied case by case and with very little means (only 4% of the 
national budget is affected to the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs and 0.3% 
to land reform). The liberalisation process is thus not a total deregulation, but prevails 
legal mechanisms of redistribution and restoration of land rights and limits State 
intervention with the aim not to distort the market functioning. Three main 
programmes, recognised by the Constitution, form the core of South Africa’s land 
reform programme: land restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution 
(Department of Land Affairs, 1997). 
 
1) Land Restitution Programme 
 
This programme, provided for in the Restitution of Land Rights (Act no. 22 of 1994) 
enables people or communities dispossessed of their land after the implementation of 
the first Natives Land Act on 19th June 1913 to apply for the restitution of their lands 
(or of the equivalent, i.e. other land or financial compensation). By the March 1996 
deadline for the deposition of claims, 68,878 individual or group demands had been 
deposited. 
 
2) Land Tenure Reform Programme 
 
This is the most complex of the land reform programmes. It aims to define and 
institutionalise every existing mode of land tenure. The objective is to make possible 
the conferral of precisely defined and more equal rights to landowners and land 
occupants. 
 
This programme mainly concerns the management of the 25,509,004ha of state-
owned land, of which 13,332,577ha make up the communal lands of the former 
reserves and bantustans (the remainder is mainly rented out or informally occupied). 
It also addresses other problematic issues, such as farm workers who have worked for 
their own gain for several years on properties owned by others, mainly whites. 
Another aim of this programme is  
 
3) Land Redistribution Programme 
 
This programme complements the two programmes discussed thus far, by helping 
previously disadvantaged people to purchase land. The programme allocates subsidies 
so that beneficiaries can buy land at market price. 
 
The land redistribution programme can take various forms including individual 
purchase, group purchase using pooled subsidies and purchase according to the 
commonage principle, which involves an entire community using their subsidies to 
purchase land which is then added to the existing communal land occupied since 1913 
or 1936. 
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1.2. Land reform in two phases 
 
Political and economic transition is often accompanied by land reform (Kay, 1998). 
Though land reform is generally agreed to be necessary to address inequality and rural 
poverty (World Bank, 1999), how to implement this reform is still debated. This is 
also the case in South Africa. Although the global economic framework of land 
reform has not changed significantly since 1994, South Africa’s policies and 
programmes have varied. Two major phases in land reform policy can be identified. 
 
1) First phase (1994-1999): policies focusing on subsistence farming 
 
The land reform policies of the first phase, implemented by the Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, Derek Hanekom, aimed at advancing subsistence 
farming. This phase stressed the importance of land reform and the development of 
small-scale agricultural production in the socio-economic development of rural areas. 
The government wanted to ensure security of food and means of existence in a 
country where there are extreme inequalities of resource distribution and where links 
between black populations and commercial-oriented farming have historically been 
vanished. As it was only focusing on land, farm as well as residential or urban land 
(for peri-urban agricultural projects), this first phase was implemented only by the 
Department of Land Affairs. 
 
During this first phase, the Department of Land Affairs allocated Settlement/Land 
Acquisition Grants (SLAG) of R15000 (later R16000) per household4 (Department of 
Land Affairs, 1997). These grants were mainly allocated within the framework of the 
Land Redistribution Programme for purchasing land, but they could also be used for 
agricultural investments (on communal land or land acquired through the Restitution 
Programme) or even for housing projects (outside the farming sector). 
 
As the grants were focusing on the rural and the poorest part of the population, very 
little extra investment occurred. SLAG has, consequently, been criticised for not 
providing the means to structurally change South Africa’s agricultural sector but in 
fact for having kept previously disadvantaged populations impovrished (Land Affairs, 
2000). 
 
2) Second phase (1999-2004): policies focusing on small-scale commercial 
farming 
 
In 1999, after the second democratic elections, Thoko Didiza took over the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Land Affairs. The focus on subsistence farming was abandoned 
and the development of an emergent commercial black farming sector became the 
ministry’s priority. Land reform measures no longer aimed at transferring land to 
black households and promoting self-sufficiency, but rather at creating a structured 
small-scale commercial farming sector, improving farm production, revitalising the 
                                                 
4
 Each household is entitled to only one SLAG. A household that uses the grant to purchase land, will 
not access any additional SLAG for the construction, improvement or other farm investments. 
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rural environment and creating employment. This strategy coincided better with the 
government’s more liberal orientation. 
 
The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) sub-programme has 
become the main programme of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (2000). 
The LRAD sub-programme does not replace the programmes implemented in 1994, 
which still exist, but builds on the work of the SLAGs for projects concerning 
agricultural development. As from 1999, SLAGs have been limited to residential 
projects. The LRAD sub-programme gives grants to previously disadvantaged people 
to help them buy farmland or develop land they have already acquired privately. 
LRAD projects focus on the transfer of agricultural land to individuals or to limited 
groups with the objective to develop commercial-oriented farming activities (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). 
 
To encourage the development of farming activities, the LRAD sub-programme 
insists that the beneficiaries contribute own funds (either actual or in-kind) to the 
project. For contributions of R5000 to R400 000 per person, the LRAD subsidies vary 
from R20 000 to R100 000 (on a decreasing scale).5 The awarding of subsidies is thus 
not only based on the equity principle, but on the viability of the project. This is 
intended to facilitate better co-operation between the Department of Land Affairs and 
the Department of Agriculture. 
 
If this political choice is as justifiable as the previous one, this new orientation implies 
a predisposition to focus on a category of potential farmers having specific means, 
such as financial, knowledge. Certain associations (NLC, 2000) assert that the LRAD 
subsidies benefit only a small elite echelon of farmers (less dependant of support then 
the most impoverished). Others note that these measures promoting the 
commercialisation of agriculture are driving forces for agricultural and rural 
revitalisation (Van Rooyen, 1997). 
 
2. A decade of land reform: preliminary observations 
 
Eleven years after the country’s first democratic elections, a preliminary diagnosis of 
the land distribution situation in South Africa is perhaps warranted. Two main aspects 
of this situation are often highlighted in South Africa’s academic and civil literature, 
namely that South Africa’s land reform is slow and that it is incapable of effectively 
addressing past inequalities. These two points will be briefly discussed in the 
following section. 
 
2.1. The slow pace of South Africa’s land reform process 
 
The land reform process shows little progress in terms of number of completed 
projects. 
 
                                                 
5
 For more details on the functioning of the LRAD grants, see the document “Land redistribution for 
agricultural development. A sub-programme of the land redistribution programme” published by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs in 2000 (Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). 
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The Tenure Reform Programme has shown the least progress. Little has changed 
since the Land Acts of 1913 and1936 in terms of uncertain land tenure for the black 
population. The complexity and diversity of existing tenure systems prompted the 
drafting in 1996 of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act to protect the 
residents of the former bantustans and reserves from abuse by corrupt traditional 
leaders, harsh administrative measures or unscrupulous investors. A new charter of 
land rights was developed, which proposed to transfer the property rights of 
communal lands, which were then still state property, to residents. The charter 
recommended flexible intermediate rights between individual and traditional rights. In 
this way, rights could be claimed by individuals, groups constituted as legal entities or 
communities with democratically elected management committees. Eventually, due to 
potential conflicts, particularly with traditional authorities, legislation of the proposed 
act was postponed till after the second democratic elections and then discarded.  
 
In August 2002, then Minister Thoko Didiza re-launched the proposal as the 
Communal Land Rights Bill. It was passed by Parliament in March 2005, just before 
the third democratic presidential elections. Nevertheless, no effective projects or 
programmes have been implemented in the short time since then, but the bill and its 
process of development and implementation have already been strongly criticised by 
both academics (Cousins, 2002) and civil society.  
 
Measures to secure the rights of farm workers through the Labour Tenants Act and the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act have in fact made commercial farmers more 
suspicious: they fear to lose their land either entirely or partly. This has contributed to 
deteriorating employment relations, increases in illegal evictions and more rapid 
mechanisation processes (decreasing job availability). 
 
The restitution programme started very slowly. In 1999, only 3508 households had 
been given access to 112,919ha (Table 1) through the handling of 41 restitution 
claims (i.e. 0.06% of 68878 demands). However, following President Mbeki’s 
instruction in 1999, advocating the finalization of the land claims by the end of 2005, 
the process was accelerated: between 1999 and November 2004, 48784 claims 
concerning 118784 households were settled. However, since 84% of these restitutions 
involved urban property and only one third resulted in effective land restitution (the 
remaining two thirds were settled through financial compensation6), only 810292ha 
changed hands. 
 
Table 1: Restitution claims settled between 1994 and November 2004 
Year Restitution 
claims 
settled 
Concerned 
households 
Hectares 
restored 
Total costs 
(thousand Rands) 
1995-1999 41 3508 112919 12601 
1999-2004 56679 151829 697373 4065950 
Total 56719 155337 810292 4078551 
Source: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (2004) & Department of Land 
Affairs (2005) 
                                                 
6
 Since every claim concerns a large number of households/individuals (sometimes more than 1000 
households), the financial compensation (representing the equivalent of the acquisition price of one or 
more commercial farms) only represents a small amount of money per household. 
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Though it also has not attained its projected objectives, the redistribution programme 
has been more efficient. The SLAG programme had at the beginning of 2001 
redistributed 1082111ha to 109457 households (Table 2). After 2001, as mentioned 
above, the LRAD programme took over farmland redistribution. Through this 
programme, about 1631 projects have been settled, totalling 663320ha and involving 
41000 households. The LRAD programme thus made a quick and promising start, 
mainly because of its relatively simple administrative processes (since it concerns the 
subsidized purchase of available self-identified private land). However, the process 
has since slowed down, mainly due to funding problems at government level, as well 
as other problems discussed below. 
 
Table 2: Redistribution projects settled between 1994 and November 2004 
Grants/ 
programmes 
Redistribution 
projects settled 
Concerned 
households  
Hectares 
redistributed 
Total cost 
(thousand Rands) 
SLAG 821 109457 1082111 NA 
LRAD 1631 41000 663320 NA 
Total 2452 150457 1745431 NA 
NA: not available 
Source: Department of Land Affairs (2005) 
 
At the end of 2004, more than ten years after the first democratic elections, only 3.1% 
of the country’s 87 million ha of farmland have been redistributed (taking all land 
transfers into account, i.e. tenure reform, land restitution and land redistribution). The 
objective of redistributing 30% of the land has subsequently been postponed till 2015. 
 
2.2. Does South Africa’s land reform have the capacity to 
address the problems created by the past? Past reflections, new 
questions 
 
Many have criticised the insufficient budgets allocated to land reform (NLC, 1998; 
Mayson, 2001), saying that the 0.3% of the national budget (685 million Rands 
available per year) set aside for land reform does not reflect a real will to accomplish 
the enormous task of solving the land inequality problem.7 
 
Other criticisms focus on institutional or structural aspects of this problem, which the 
implemented measures and instruments do not adequately address. Makgobola 
(1996), Turner and Ibsen (2000), Kariuki (2001) and Lahiff (2005) denounce the 
liberal policies implemented in South Africa and show that land reform and 
agricultural development will not be possible as long as the entire situation (including 
aspects such as lack of adapted institutions, current social insecurity and increasing 
land pressure) does not allow the correct functioning of the land market, which is 
always characterized by distortions and frequent uncertainties. These authors claim 
that an approach guided only by offer and demand and not complemented by 
                                                 
7
 This point is supported by the fact that in 1998-1999 only 359 million and in 2000-2001 only 103 
million were used of the 685 million Rands available per year for land reform (Mayson, 2001). 
Similarly, only 50 million Rands are allocated to the LRAD programme. Considering land prices, this 
amount is grossly inadequate for the objectives of the programme. 
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regulation measures is not enough to transform the legacy of the racial configuration 
of South Africa’s territory. For example, South Africa still does not have a land tax. 
Neglected in the 1980s so as not to disadvantage white farmers, the only owners of 
land (Nieuwoudt, 1987), land tax would encourage the commercialisation and thus the 
offering of land on the market. Similarly, South Africa lacks regulations about land 
utilisation and the conservation of under- or unutilised land, a situation which thus 
creates no extra costs and offers landowners no incentive to sell this neglected land. In 
addition, Act 70 of 1970 which forbids subdivision of properties, implemented under 
apartheid to limit the access of farm workers to land, has not yet been abolished 
(Department of Agriculture, 2001). This law continues to limit disadvantaged farmers 
now having difficulty accessing important credit. Lastly, the National African 
Farmers Union (NAFU) points out that a lack of transparency obscures what is 
actually happening in the land market. 97.5% of land transactions take place outside 
the framework of the land reform programmes, mostly occurring on local markets or 
through intra-community arrangements. No instruments exist to control or counter 
such practices (Anseeuw, 2004). 
 
Other analysts (Aliber & Mokoena, 2000; NLC, 2000) complain about administrative 
complexity and excessive bureaucracy. They note that a transaction carried out within 
the framework of the land reform programmes takes up to two years. These extremely 
long cycles not only lead land owners to favour faster and less bureaucratic 
possibilities, but also hamper beneficiaries from benefiting from the best 
opportunities. This excessive bureaucratisation, together with the lack of public 
resources allocated to land reform, including human and financial support, explain the 
fact that the Department of Land Affairs is only a ‘second choice negotiator’ (Aliber 
& Mokoena, 2000). Furthermore, they note that organizational problems exist within 
and between different departments. These problems cause delays and create 
inconsistencies in the policies, measures and actions of these various stakeholders. 
This is particularly problematic between the Department of Agriculture and the 
Department of Land Affairs. This point is also stressed by liberal critics. Kirsten and 
Van Zyl (1999), for example, complain that lack of liberalization with consequent 
bureaucratization of the reform programmes obstruct development and investment in 
agriculture. 
 
If the need and relevancy of land reform are accepted in South Africa and in many 
countries characterized by high economic inequality rates, the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the land reform programmes are still under 
discussion (World Bank, 1999; Department of Land Affairs, 2005).8 A common 
feature of most current approaches to land reform is that they do not link land reform 
and agricultural or rural development. Indeed, the absence of developmental concerns 
in these debates is striking. Land reform is presently mainly understood and evaluated 
as the actual physical quantity of land transferred from the ownership of whites to that 
of previously disadvantaged populations. The question whether this land reform has 
led to development, better livelihoods for the beneficiaries and increased production 
has been neglected. The links between land reform and development seldom if ever 
appear in South Africa’s literature or policy measures. 
                                                 
8
 A good example of such discussions is the recent National Land Summit is organised in July this year 
by the ANC, where the principles and the legitimacy of different land reform options were discussed 
(Department of Land Affairs, 2005). 
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The government has attempted several measures since 1999 to improve the efficiency 
of land reform. Firstly, the LRAD programme was developed, as discussed above. 
Focussing on developing small-scale emergent farmers, it also aims to improve 
coordination between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Land 
Affairs. Secondly, the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS) 
was implemented, which has the main objective of improving coordination of public 
action and service delivery at the local level, so as to enable sustainable development. 
Thirdly, land reform has been included in the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) of 
municipalities, guided by the Land Development Objectives (LDOs) formulated for 
the use of local government. Finally, the Department of Land Affairs developed a 
Strategic Plan for 2004-2007 which should accelerate the delivery of land for 
development9 (Mbeki, 2004: 11). 
 
These measures however mainly focus on organisational or governance aspects of 
land reform, aiming for better coordination and service delivery. However, effective 
means for structural assessment of the effects of land reform farms are still lacking. 
Two sources confirm this. Firstly, a study by Anseeuw (2004) emphasises that the 
land reform programmes are not accompanied by other necessary reforms, either 
agrarian or territorial. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative analyses of the 
potential results of the land reform programmes, Anseeuw warns that these 
programmes have limited potential for agricultural development. Secondly, early data 
about the success of restored farms is alarming: 11 years after the first democratic 
elections, nine after the implementation of the SLAG programme and four after that 
of the LRAD programme, 70% of all South African land reform projects in the post-
settlement phase are experiencing operational difficulties or are considered 
unsuccessful (Department of Agriculture, 2004; RLCC, 2004). Most land reform 
beneficiaries derive few benefits from their land. Sender (2002) even states that 
present land reform programmes had in several cases negative effects on poverty 
alleviation. These facts are all the more disturbing considering that only about 4% of 
claimed land has been redistributed so far and that another 26% is expected to be 
transferred by 2015. 
 
Thus even though the ISRDS and the land reform programmes are at present still not 
fully implemented, early negative observations of their effectiveness suggest that 
improving organisational efficiency and building delivery capacity are not sufficient 
for solving South Africa’s land reform problems. Instead, the results of the 
Department of Land Affairs’ first assessment suggest that weak links between land 
reform and development are the most important factors to consider. 
 
Almost ten years after the implementation of land reform in South Africa, this 
reform’s contribution to development must be evaluated. Rather than measuring the 
quantity of land that has been transferred, the consequences and impacts of this land 
                                                 
9
 A number of developments and programmes have been put in place as part of an integrated 
developmental approach to land reform. These include the Land Care Programme funded by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, the Extended Public Works Programme and the CASP 
programme, funded by the Department of Agriculture, offering subsidies to land reform beneficiaries to 
be used for improving land and infrastructure. 
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reform must be assessed. This main research objective has several sub-questions, at 
the levels of farm and household. 
 
First of all, at farm level: 
• What has happened to the restored farms? Has the transferred land undergone 
economic development? Were the beneficiaries in a position to develop 
economically viable farming activities? What types of activity are developed on 
these farms? 
• How are these farms organized? How are the activities on these farms organized? 
Are the institutional structures (implemented through land affairs commissions) 
effective in organizing and/or managing these farms? 
• Are these farms able to generate sufficient income for the beneficiaries?  
 
Second, at household level: 
• Can people benefit from these farms? Have the beneficiaries’ livelihoods 
improved since they acquired land? Does access to land change the livelihood of 
the rural poor (in terms of monthly income, living conditions etc)? 
 
Answering these questions will yield a more complete view of how land reform 
contributes to rural development in South Africa. 
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II. Assessing land reform in the context of 
development: research methodology 
 
As mentioned above, land reform cannot only be assessed by measuring the quantity 
of land redistributed; the impact of land reform on economic and social development 
must also be investigated. However, no first-hand primary data about this issue is 
currently available. The necessary information thus needs to be collected. 
 
This chapter will detail the research methodology applied to answer the questions 
listed in Chapter I. First of all, the concept of development will be detailed, which will 
lead, in a second part, to the identification of the determinants to consider and to the 
development of a research methodology. The third part of this chapter details the 
research set-up and clarifies the choice of the geographical research area. The fourth 
and last part presents the effective realized fieldwork. 
 
1. Development: the concept applied to land reform in South 
Africa 
 
Behind every policy intervention lies some theoretical assumption, either overt or 
covert, about the nature of development. There has been considerable debate over the 
definition, explanation, practice and evaluation of development over the past few 
decades. Many studies assume that no clear consensus about the definition of socio-
economic development is possible. This study aims to supply some quantitative and 
qualitative indicators that will help to fill this gap.  
 
One of the earliest theoretical approaches measures development in terms of 
economic growth using national income indicators (Hettne, 1990).10 In the 1960s and 
1970s, evidence increasingly suggested that while a few developing countries manage 
to increase their growth rates and restructure their economies, the majority are unable 
to achieve such results, being plagued with increased poverty and debt, political 
repression, social inequality, displacement of traditional values and environmental 
damage (Conyers & Hills, 1984). 
 
Newer approaches thus understood that development must also be assessed in terms 
of its socio-economic effects within a developing country, its ability to empower the 
poor with basic needs for human development (McGranahan, 1973; Amin, 1974). The 
goals of development were redefined with much greater emphasis on non-economic 
aspects. Development came to be conceived of and measured in terms not only of 
economic factors but also social well-being, political structures and the physical 
environment (UNDP, 1991). This led to a broader conception of development which 
includes alternative dimensions such as human autonomy, equity, empowerment and 
cultural identity. This approach also suggests that development occurs at different 
levels, not just nationally, but must also be assessed at all levels if the human, equity, 
                                                 
10
 This approach is modelled on evolutionary theory, assuming that developing countries aspire to 
achieve the type of society that exists in the developed world by passing through a number of stages of 
economic growth similar to those which the countries of western Europe had experienced (Rostow, 
1960). 
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livelihood and poverty aspects of development are to be considered. Development 
concerns an individual level (satisfaction of basic needs in a social context), an 
intermediary or meso level (project feasibility and sustainability) and a global level 
(economic growth). Disaggregated assessments, at household or project level, are 
more appropriate in such cases. 
 
Our objective here is not to discuss different definitions, approaches or points of view, 
but to explore how these different concepts and approaches to development can be 
linked to the process of South African land reform.  
 
Like development, land reform does not only have implications at a global level, i.e. 
economic growth (World Bank, 1999). Since development and poverty alleviation are 
two of the major objectives of land reform, social and economic factors affecting land 
reform projects and beneficiaries must also be considered (Anseeuw & Mathebula, 
2006). Since the global level is not the objective of this research project, assessing 
land reform in the context of development implies that11: 
• the project should maintain or enhance its capacities and assets (Chambers, 1987), 
i.e. involve long-term maintenance and survivability (if not enhancement); 
• the beneficiaries should benefit from stocks and flows of food and income 
adequate for basic human needs to be met (Attfield et al., 2004); 
 
2. Assessing land reform in conjunction with development 
 
The previous section shows the complexity of assessing land reform in terms of 
development. Economic, social and ecological aspects have to be taken into account 
at various different levels. 
 
Thus a specific research methodology is needed to assess land reform. First of all, 
according to the objectives of this study, we have to define precisely the units to be 
observed and the geographical area to be explored. The types of land reform projects 
to be assessed must also be identified. 
 
2.1. Land reform projects and beneficiaries as observation 
units 
 
Assessing the impact of land reform on development cannot be done at the sole level 
of the farm. Therefore in defining the units to be observed, two levels of observation 
and analysis are retained, namely the land reform project and the land reform 
beneficiary. 
 
• The land reform project: 
The land reform project is the relevant entity to gather information concerning its 
production structure, but also about the initial phase of land acquisition, organization 
within projects/farms, institutional relations between projects/farms and external 
institutions, problems at project level, etc. 
                                                 
11
 A third condition related to development could be added: without undermining other such 
livelihoods, or potential livelihoods for the coming generation (Attfield et al., 2004). 
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Gathering information at project level will yield a broad understanding of how the 
farm was acquired, how it operates and how it evolves. However, such aspects as the 
project’s internal framework and individual people’s behaviour, benefits, etc. can only 
be investigated at beneficiary level. 
 
• Land reform beneficiary: 
Investigating land reform at beneficiary level is needed to better understand the 
position of each beneficiary within the project/farm structure and to assess their 
individual behaviour related to the project. Assessing whether land reform affects 
livelihoods necessitates the identification of the benefits, opportunities, problems, etc. 
of the beneficiaries. 
 
Integrating this information with that gathered at project level reveals the 
relationships each individual has within the group, how he/she benefits (or not) from 
land reform and, consequently, how he/she behaves towards this group and/or project. 
 
2.2. Municipality as geographical research unit 
 
Since land reform happens all over South Africa’s geographical area, we had to 
choose a narrower research area. The municipality was identified as the relevant unit 
for two complementary reasons: 
 
• The municipal entity is the smallest entity enclosing almost all administrative 
structures. Unlike a ward, which is the smallest administrative entity (which only 
has a ward council), a municipality has regional offices of the Department of 
Agriculture, Department of Public Works, etc. Gathering information at 
municipality level thus remains more centralized. 
 
• Geographically, a municipality is a single administrative entity yet is large enough 
to host enough land reform projects to yield comprehensive data in terms of 
quantity, quality and diversity of projects. 
 
2.3. Assessing restitution, SLAG and LRAD projects 
 
This research project focuses on restitution and redistribution (SLAG and LRAD) 
projects. The land tenure reform programme is not included. This is because few land 
tenure reform projects have been implemented as yet. Furthermore, those which have 
been implemented do not directly deal with land, access to land or development, 
which are the focus of this study. (The Labour Tenants and Extension of Security of 
Tenure Acts, for example, deal with the protection of farm workers’ rights). 
 
3. The choice of Mole-mole municipality 
 
The municipality of Mole-mole in the Limpopo Province was chosen as the research 
site of this project. The choice was motivated by the importance of land reform in the 
Limpopo Province as a whole and in the Mole-mole municipality in particular. 
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3.1. Importance of land reform in the Limpopo Province 
 
As mentioned above, most of South Africa is currently experiencing land reform. The 
Limpopo Province was chosen for several reasons. 
 
Firstly, this province shows an extremely skewed distribution of land ownership 
arising from the homeland system: of Limpopo’s total area, i.e. 123600km2, two 
thirds, or 87000km2, were allocated under apartheid for white private ownership and 
use. The province had 7200 commercial farming units in 1994 (SSA, 1996) (Figure 
1). Approximately 36000 km2 (one third of Limpopo’s land area) were included into 
former homelands. This land, the great majority held under some form of communal 
tenure (Lahiff, 1997), was home to about 299000 black small-scale farmers (SSA, 
1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: South Africa’s former homelands’ territories in 1994 
Source: Adapted from Gervais-Lambony, 1997. 
 
Secondly, Limpopo Province is very active in land reform. With 236450ha 
redistributed or restituted since 1994, officially benefiting 115393 people, Limpopo is 
the fourth most active province in land reform in terms of number of beneficiaries. It 
represents 13.2% of South Africa’s present land area involved in land reform (Table 
3). 
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Table 3: Land reform in South Africa by province 
Redistribution Restitution Total Province 
Hectares Beneficiaries Hectares Beneficiaries Hectares Beneficiaries 
Eastern Cape 314368 13600 46123 147860 360491 161460 
Free State 226154 3482 45748 18222 271902 21704 
Gauteng 32766 2741 3555 58221 36321 60962 
Kwazulu Natal 297975 8535 188441 161670 486416 170205 
Limpopo 107980 2353 128470 113040 236450 115393 
Mpumalanga 135989 1497 91318 141671 227307 143168 
Northwest 186695 6573 71925 76455 258620 83028 
Northern Cape 539569 617 233634 34118 773203 34735 
Western Cape 110315 3475 3101 78532 113416 82007 
Total 1951815 42873 812315 829789 2764130 872662 
Source: Department of Land Affairs (2005). 
 
Thirdly, the land circumstance patterns in Limpopo are strongly linked with the 
relative poverty of the Province. The province’s contribution to South Africa’s GDP 
was 3.8% in 1996 (SSA, 1998). Furthermore, Limpopo’s economy is vulnerable to 
external shocks due to its dependence on the primary sectors of mining and 
agriculture. Agriculture contributes approximately to 38% of the GDP of the province 
and provides 17% of the formal employment (SSA, 1998). The average household 
income of R19176 per year is also much lower than South Africa’s yearly average of 
R29004. Other than this formal employment, most rural households rely on some 
agricultural activity mostly for auto-consumption.  
 
Finally, Limpopo is relatively rural when compared to South Africa's other provinces. 
According to the 2001 census (SSA, 2001), of the 5.3 million inhabitants of Limpopo, 
89% live in rural areas (significantly more than the national average of 46%). Due to 
land holding patterns in the Province, these 89% occupy only 33% of the available 
land (Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1995). As a result, land and agriculture 
are important features in the economy of the Limpopo Province. Linking land reform 
and development could thus be a very useful instrument to alleviate poverty and to 
improve local livelihoods in the province. 
 
Though the whole of the Limpopo Province is suitable for this research, time 
constraints prompted the choice of a smaller, more precise area in order, firstly, to 
circumscribe precisely the research area and, secondly, to gather the necessary 
information so as to assess all the different aspects and programmes of South Africa’s 
land reform process. 
 
Three major criteria determined the choice of observation entity to link land reform 
analyses to development: firstly a relevant geographical/administrative entity, 
secondly the number of land reform projects and thirdly the links with the original 
communities from which the land reform beneficiaries come. Consideration of these 
criteria led to the choice of the municipality of Mole-mole as the geographical 
research area. 
 
Land Reform and Development 
 
Postgraduate School of Agriculture and Rural Development 
 
 
16
3.2. Mole-mole municipality: a node for land reform within 
the Limpopo Province  
 
Mole-mole was chosen within the Limpopo Province because of the importance of 
land reform to this municipality and the presence within its bounds of a high number 
of land reform projects (redistribution and restitution) processed in the not-too-recent 
past. This combination of factors allowed our data collection to cover the largest 
possible diversity of projects. 
 
Mole-mole is predominantly a rural municipality with substantial potential for 
development, particularly commercial agricultural development. The main features 
making the area so suitable for agricultural growth and development are the 
availability and reliability of its underground water, a generally warm climate and the 
suitability of the soil for cultivation and most particularly irrigation (Mole-mole 
Municipality, 2004). 
 
Approximately 80% of the municipal area is used for farming (subsistence and 
commercial). The north-western part of the municipal area consists mostly of 
privately owned commercial farms. A large proportion of various farming products 
are exported to neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique and more 
widely. Most families have a piece of land for subsistence farming. People in the area 
tend to have high expectations of land reform, especially since only 53% are engaged 
in formal or informal employment (Mole-mole Municipality, 2004). A detailed 
description of Mole-mole can be found in annexure I. 
 
Mole-mole has a total of 42 land reform projects, involving a total 31800ha of land 
and officially benefiting 5152 households (Table 4). Though neighbouring 
municipality BelaBela has more land reform projects (43) and Mogalakwena a larger 
area of land involved, neither of these municipalities presents the same diversity of 
land reform projects as Mole-mole. BelaBela has mostly LRAD projects that have just 
been implemented and are too young to be evaluated, and Mogalakwena has only 13 
large projects. 
 
Mole-mole has (Table 4, Figure 2) (Limpopo Provincial Department of Agriculture, 
2005): 
• 6 restitution projects, concerning in total 16901ha and officially 3791 households; 
• 17 SLAG projects, concerning 8747ha and officially 1183 beneficiaries; and 
• 19 LRAD projects, concerning 4027ha and officially 178 beneficiaries. 
 
These 42 projects involve 39 farms in total (a project can encompass several farms or 
concern only part of a farm) (Figure 2). Another 14 claims have not yet been 
processed (Figure 3). 
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Table 4: Limpopo land reform projects per municipality 
 
Restitution SLAG LRAD TOTAL Municipality 
Number of 
projects 
 
Number of 
households 
Hectares Number of 
projects 
Number of 
households 
Hectares Number of 
projects 
Number of 
households 
Hectares Number of 
projects 
Number of 
households 
Hectares 
BelaBela 1 111 1966 4 351 2236 38 127 5743 43 589 9945 
Blouberg    2 67 1111 2 20 64 4 89 1175 
Gr Groblersdal    5 403 254    5 403 254 
Gr Letaba 2 1505 7328 1 80 193    3 1506 7521 
Gr Phalaborwa       3 12 64 3 12 64 
Gr Tzaneen 2 1844 3566 13 884 2223 7 163 608 22 2891 6397 
Gr Tubatse    2 484 2986    2 484 2986 
Lephalale    3 134 1317 11 67 11026 14 201 12343 
Makhado 7 2337 8227 1 98 561 19 28 7993 28 2463 16781 
Makhuduthamaga 1 0 89       1 0 89 
Modimolle 2 1172 14695    3 13 12 4 1185 14707 
Mogalakwena 4 1188 24717 3 854 24454 6 62 823 11 2104 49994 
Mole-mole 6 3791 16901 17 1183 8747 19 178 4027 42 5152 31800 
Mookgopong 3 324 3831 4 120 1388 7 41 8476 14 485 13695 
Mutale 1 909 27       1 909 27 
Polokwane 2 608 4125 10 1059 11883 12 428 5033 24 2095 21041 
Thabazimbi       2 12 3716 2 12 3716 
TOTAL 31 13789 84472 65 5717 57356 120 1163 47591 223 21580 192535 
Source: Limpopo Provincial Department of Agriculture, 2005. 
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Figure 2: Processed land reform farms in Mole-mole 
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Figure 3: Processed and unprocessed land reform claims in Mole-mole 
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Legend Figure 3 
Farm No Farm No Farm No 
APPELFONTEIN 1 POTSDAM 19 KLEINFONTEIN 37 
BETHESDA 2 RIETBULT 20 KOPJE ALLEEN 38 
COMBRO 3 RUSTFONTEIN 21 KRAALHOEK 39 
DRIEFONTEIN 4 WALDBURG 22 LOCATIE VAN RAMAGOEP 40 
DROOGELOOP 5 WILGEBOSCHFONTEIN 23 MAGATASPRUIT 41 
DUITSCHLAND 6 ZANDRIVIERSPOORT 24 MAROELABULT 42 
EERSTE RECHTER 7 ZOEKMAKAAR 25 MOOIPLAATS 43 
FOURIESKOLK 8 BLOEMTUIN 26 NET RECHT 44 
GELUKSFONTEIN 9 BLOOMFIELD 27 RIETGAT 45 
GOEDGEDACHT 10 DOORNLAAGTE 28 SMITSKRAAL 46 
GROBLER 11 DRIEFONTEIN 29 UITKOMS 47 
INDERHIKEN 12 DROOGEGROND 30 UITKOMST 48 
INDERHIKEN 13 DROOGELOOP 31 VREDE 49 
KALKFONTEIN 14 GELUK 32 WATERVAL 50 
MODDERFONTEIN 15 GROBLER 33 WEESKIND 51 
NOOYENSFONTEIN 16 HAASBULT 34 WILGEBOSCHFONTEIN 52 
NOOYENSFONTEIN 17 HATTINGSBURG 35 ZANDBULT 53 
PELGRIMSRUST 18 KLEIN BEGIN 36   
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Mole-mole has an important number of land reform projects mainly because in 1994 
the land was entirely owned by whites. Furthermore, according to several local 
technical staff interviewed during the survey, the municipality’s relative proximity to 
Polokwane could have also speeded up the reform process. 
 
 
4. Data collection and fieldwork 
 
Since very little primary data are available at municipal level, data collection was 
organized. This involved a literature review, collection of general information through 
interviews and zoning and administration of a detailed questionnaire. 
 
4.1. Review of available data and literature 
 
Although very little information was available, existing data was gathered through a 
review of the available literature, with two specific foci: 
• General information about Mole-mole, including the establishment and evolution 
of social and economic structures, focusing on history (origins, deportations), the 
municipality’s economy and agricultural situation; and 
• Statistical and administrative information, especially concerning land reform on 
both local and provincial level. 
 
4.2. Collection of general information through interviews and 
zoning 
 
Additional general information was gathered to complement local, often historical 
information and so yield a better understanding not only of geographical and natural 
features but also socio-economic factors and organisations within the research area. 
 
This information was gathered through: 
• Interviews with local agents of the Department of Agriculture (at the provincial, 
municipal and local levels) and with members of the local councils; and 
• Zoning of the area and local communities in collaboration with key informants 
from the area such as traditional leaders, councillors and extension officers. 
 
4.3. Questionnaire on land reform and development 
 
The most important method for collecting the primary data needed to assess the 
impact of land reform on development was an open-ended questionnaire administered 
as a monographic interview. 
 
4.3.1. Sample size 
 
Since only Mole-mole Municipality was selected for this project, the sample size was 
kept extensive by including all the land reform projects: all 42 land reform projects 
were selected for the project (Table 5). 
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Table 5: Mole-mole’s land reform projects 
Project House-
holds 
Area 
(ha) 
LR type Transfer 
date 
Farm Name 
Bethesda 574 3580 Restitution 04.04.2004 Bethesda 208LT 
Fanang Diatla Trust 49 62 SLAG 09.02.2000 Ptn 69 & 70 of Zoekmekaar 778 LS 
Fishof comokgerepi 4 825 LRAD 01.01.2002 Waldburg 1261 LS (Port1-4&REM) 
Ga-Mabohlajane (urban) 936 52 Restitution 04.10.2004 Duitschland 169 LS(Port.8 
Babogadi Trust 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 LS (Port.4) 
Gotlotlometsa TR 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 Ls (Port.13) 
Letswa Tshemong 16 28 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 LS (Port.21) 
Letjepe Mpolaye 17 26 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 LS (Port.22) 
Bare Gakeleme Trust 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 LS (Port.5) 
Keya Lema Trust 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 LS (Port.6) 
Ke Lema Kelenosptr 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 Ls (Port.7) 
Mokgadi Trust 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 LS (Port.8) 
Letlapa Go Lema TR 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfonteis 127 LS (Port.9) 
Mmabafaata Trust 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 Ls (Port.10) 
Lephala Le Basom 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 LS (Port.11) 
Basomi Trust 6 9 LRAD 01.02.2005 Geluksfontein 127 LS (Port.12) 
Hivuyerilwile Trust 30 669 SLAG 04.07.2000 Nooyenfontein 780 LS Rem of Ptn  
Ikageng  104 418 SLAG 16.11.1998 Driefontein 777 LS&REM aldersyde 
Kgadima 88 1140 SLAG 05.10.2000 Wilgebosschfontein 818 LSN Ptn 
Lehlabile Trust 43 720 SLAG 01.02.2000 Rem of ptn3 of Zoekmekaar 778 LS 
Lehlareng 52 1139 SLAG 17.11.2000 Pelgrimsrust 782 LS 
Mapiribiri 68 289 SLAG 26.05.1999 Driefontein 777 Ptn 5 &8 
Maiwasshe Estate 3 916 LRAD 01.05.2002 Goegdedacht1179LS(REM) 
Makgato 55 186 SLAG 28.01.2000 Zoekmekaar 778 LS rem ptn 12&34 
Makhamotse 121 1392 SLAG 09.11.2000 Rustfontein 781 LS 
Makotopong 950 3600 Restitution 26.02.2002 Kalkfontein 776 LS 
Marginalised 137 973 SLAG 25.06.1998 Nooyenfontein 780l LS plot3, Driefontein, Alderside 
Marobala-O-Itsose 427 7148 Restitution 16.01.2004 Appelfontein 189LS, Combro 163LS, Inderhiken 165LS,  
Potsdam 128LS 
Marobala Chicken 88 232 SLAG 06.06.1999 Ptn 6 of Driefontein 777 Ls 
Matau Investment Trust 60 524 SLAG 28.08.2000 Ptn 1 of Zandrivierpoort 851LS 
Matshehla 60 396 SLAG 26.05.1999 Ptn 7 of Driefontein 777 Ls 
Morebene 590 2573 Restitution 01.07.2005 Zoekmekaar 788LS Ptns 6,19,21,24,25,44,46,48,56,57,  
Modderfontein 517LS Ptns 3, Fourieskolk 1174LS Ptns 2 
Oracle Props 1044 CC 3 400 LRAD 01.01.2002 Rietbult 523LS(PORT1) 
Re a leka 12 7 LRAD 01.03.2005 Soekmakaar ah (Port.10,11, &12) 
Soka Leholo 35 104 SLAG 28.01.2000 Ptn 71 of Zoekmekaar 773 
Thusanang Trust 45 85 SLAG 25.05.1999 Ptn 12 of Zoekmekaar 778 ls 
SpringKaan Farm 3 566 LRAD 01.07.2005 Droogeloop 516 LS 
Tau-tlou-phuti Project 2 259 LRAD 01.01.2005 Eerstee Rechter 794 LS (Port.3) 
Waterval 59 324 SLAG 01.10.2000 Grobler 776 LS REM & Ptn 3 
Re Ya Lema Project 32 164 LRAD Not yet Geluksfontein 127 LS (Port.24) 
Makgato Rstitution 1821 NA Restitution Not yet  
Up North/Central 60 605 SLAG 01.02.2005 Rem of Nooyenfontein 780 LS 
* NA: Not available 
Source: Limpopo Provincial Depatrment of Agriculture, 2005. 
 
Unfortunately, three of the 42, namely Re Ya Lema, Makgato and Up North/Central 
could not be assessed for several reasons: 
• Re Ya Lema: though negotiations began more than two years ago and Land 
Affairs has agreed on the transfer, conflicts and procedure complications have 
delayed the transfer of the land. The previous owner still occupies the land. Even 
though the beneficiaries do not have access to the land, they were interviewed 
about problems, organisational factors, actions, future plans and expectations. 
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• Makgato Restitution: in total this involves 14 farms in Mole-mole. Though some 
have been transferred, the majority must still be processed. None is presently 
occupied by the beneficiaries. The chairman of the trust was nevertheless briefly 
interviewed. 
• Up North/Central: this land reform project has not yet been realised due to 
organisational problems. None of the beneficiaries could be reached for interview. 
 
Of the total 42 projects, 39 processed projects were assessed, two projects in the phase 
of finalisation were interviewed and one project was not evaluated. 
 
4.3.2. Land reform beneficiaries interviewed 
 
As the majority of the projects (except some LRAD farms) involve a large number of 
beneficiaries, it was decided to interview the management committee of each project, 
since they represent the legal entity (Communal Property Association (CPA), Trust or 
Close Corporation (CC)) of the project, as well as at least one beneficiary who is not a 
management committee member. This was necessary to reach the two levels 
investigated in this research project, namely project and beneficiary, revealing 
differing points of view and opinions. 
 
However, as we will see later, many of these projects do not involve the total number 
of beneficiaries. Indeed, in most cases only few beneficiaries are actively engaged in 
the project. In these cases, all active beneficiaries were interviewed. 
 
4.3.3. Open-ended questionnaire 
 
As discussed above, land reform must be assessed both at project level and at 
beneficiary level. Accordingly, the questionnaire has two main parts, enquiring about 
these two levels. 
 
Information about the land reform project includes: 
• Description of the land reform project: acquisition process, infrastructural and 
structural description of the project, organisation within the project; 
• Evolution of the project: past and present activities and production structures, 
overall evolution of the project; 
• Institutional integration of the project: type of association in which the project is 
involved, the (private/public) institutions with which it deals, collective action and 
network structures in which it is engaged; and 
• Description of factors limiting the project: problems, limiting aspects and 
obstacles to development. 
 
Information about the land reform beneficiaries includes: 
• Description of the beneficiary’s individual situation: origin, involvement, tasks; 
• Position of the beneficiary within the beneficiary’s group: links and relationships 
between the beneficiaries; 
• Institutional integration of the beneficiary: type of association in which the 
beneficiary is involved, collective action and network structures in which he/she is 
engaged, links the beneficiary maintains with his/her community of origin; 
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• Trajectory of the beneficiary: his/her professional and social situation before 
acquisition of the farm; and 
• Links to the community: relationship the beneficiary had and maintains with 
his/her original community, importance he/she attaches to the community, reasons 
for maintaining or breaking these links. 
 
4.4. Additional information 
 
Additional information was gathered on two main issues: 
• The collaboration and cooperation between land reform projects within the Mole-
mole area, including issues such as what type of associations exist, how they 
developed, what their objectives are. Chairpersons of these associations and 
organisations, identified through the questionnaires, were thus also interviewed. 
• The relationships between the beneficiaries and the former (white) property 
owners. Interviews with the former property owners were also organised to gain 
an external view of the land reform projects and to better understand the reasons 
for or against cooperation between these two parties. 
 
During the course of the data collection we spent several weeks on land reform 
projects within Mole-mole, and so gained a better understanding of the organisation, 
values and points of view of the beneficiaries. Informal discussions helped us to grasp 
the reasons and logic behind some actions, and the people’s way of living and 
reasoning. 
 
4.5. Fieldwork 
 
All the fieldwork was conducted by the main researcher supported by a research 
assistant who spoke the local language. The interviews mostly took place on the 
farms. They lasted between one and three hours and often culminated in a tour of the 
farm. 
 
To help avoid practical problems, a general meeting was organized before the project 
began. At this meeting representatives of all the land reform projects in Mole-mole 
came together. This enabled us to gather the necessary logistic facts (e.g. the sites of 
the projects), to introduce ourselves and the project to the beneficiaries, to discuss the 
project with them and to build trust with our potential interviewees. We also engaged 
a local facilitator to assist us with finding the farms, communicating with 
beneficiaries and build up trust 
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III. Land reform in Mole-mole in the context of 
development 
 
Land reform is a recent development in South Africa. Though the process of land 
reform has been extensively studied, its effective results have not yet been assessed. 
To assess the links between land reform and development, an analytical description of 
the land reform projects investigated in this study is necessary.  
 
This chapter has two related foci. The first is an overall description of the state of land 
reform in Mole-mole. It details field observations at project and beneficiary levels and 
presents some success stories. The second presents an analysis of these observations 
to identify some of the successes and failures of land reform in the region. This will 
enable us to suggest some possible reasons for these successes and failures. 
 
1. Land reform, success or failure? A first description 
 
This description of land reform in Mole-mole has four parts: 1) overall description of 
the land reform projects in Mole-mole; 2) presentation of the negative trajectories of 
the land reform projects; 3) discussion of the minimal impact land reform has had on 
the beneficiaries; and 4) description of the only three successful land reform projects 
in Mole-mole. 
 
1.1. Description of Mole-mole’s land reform projects 
 
Mole-mole’s land reform projects involve, to date, 28887ha (9.4% of Mole-mole’s 
total area) and officially 4691 beneficiary households. The characteristics of the 
individual projects vary greatly according to the type of land reform. 
 
Of the 39 projects assessed, five are restitution projects, 16 SLAG projects and 18 
LRAD projects (Table 6). 
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Table 6: Land reform in Mole-mole by type of land reform project 
Type of land 
reform project 
Project Legal 
entity 
Title 
deed 
Origin Transfer 
date 
Households Area (ha) 
Rita/Bethesda CPA n Moletsi/pietersburg 04.04.2004 574 3580 
Ga-Mabohlajane (urban) CPA n Koninggratz/Dendron 04.10.2004 936 52 
Makotopong CPA y Makotopong/Pietersburg 26.02.2002 950 3600 
Marobala-O-Itsose CPA y Moletsi/Dendron/Nelspruit 16.01.2004 427 7148 
RESTITUTION 
Morebene CPA n Zoekmekaar/Matoks 01.07.2005 590 2573 
Total restitution      3477 16953 
Fanang Diatla Trust Trust y Zoekmekaar 09.02.2000 49 62 
Hivuyerilwile Trust Trust y Sekgopo 04.07.2000 30 669 
Ikageng  Trust y Dikgale 16.11.1998 104 418 
Kgadima Trust y Sekgopo 05.10.2000 88 1140 
Lehlabile Trust Trust y Zoekmekaar 01.02.2000 43 720 
Lehlareng Trust y Sekgopo 17.11.2000 52 1139 
Mapiribiri Trust y Dikgale 26.05.1999 68 289 
Makgato Trust y Makgato 28.01.2000 55 186 
Makhamotse Trust y Sekgopo 09.11.2000 121 1392 
Marginalised Trust y Dikgale 25.06.1998 137 973 
Marobala Chicken Trust y Dikgale 06.06.1999 88 232 
Matau Investment Trust Trust y Makgato 28.08.2000 60 524 
Matshehla Trust y Dikgale 26.05.1999 60 396 
Soka Leholo Trust y Makgato 28.01.2000 35 104 
Thusanang Trust Trust y Ramokgopa 25.05.1999 45 85 
SLAG 
Waterval Trust y Dikgale 01.10.2000 59 324 
Total SLAG      1094 8653 
Fishof comokgerepi cc y Blouberg 01.01.2002 4 825 
Maiwasshe Estate cc y Thoyoyandou 01.05.2002 3 916 
Oracle Props 1044 CC cc y Polokwane, Aganag 01.01.2002 3 400 
Re a leka cc n Moletsi/Ramagopa 01.03.2005 12 7 
SpringKaan Farm cc y Matoks/Pietersburg 01.07.2005 3 566 
Tau-tlou-phuti Project cc y Lebowa Kgomo 01.01.2005 2 259 
Babogadi Trust Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
Gotlotlometsa TR Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
Letswa Tshemong Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 16 28 
Letjepe Mpolaye Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 17 26 
Bare Gakeleme Trust Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
Keya Lema Trust Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
Ke Lema Kelenosptr Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
Mokgadi Trust Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
Letlapa Go Lema TR Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
Mmabafaata Trust Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
Lephala Le Basom Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
LRAD 
Basomi Trust Trust y Ga-Poopedi 01.02.2005 6 9 
Total LRAD      120 3117 
TOTAL      4691 28887 
Source: Limpopo Provincial Department of Agriculture, 2005. 
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1.1.1. Restitution projects 
 
The restitution farms, all claimed around 1996, were transferred between 2002 and 
2005. These restitution projects involve communities displaced between 1960 and 
1970 and mostly scattered to different places. As a result the projects are composed of 
subdivided groups of people, often with different traditional leaders, who have come 
from relatively far and diverse places (some beneficiaries of the Marobala-O-Itsose 
project came from Nelspruit, Mpumalanga, for example). The projects are structured 
through Communal Property Associations (CPAs). Each CPA is managed by a 
committee, which is generally elected by the beneficiaries. This committee often 
represents the entire community. As a result, in all restitution cases, traditional 
hierarchical structures are still very much present. The CPAs, through their 
committees and members, have each adopted a constitution pre-drafted by the 
Commission for Land Restitution and often implemented without any amendments. 
Though all these restitution claims have already been processed, three of the five still 
do not have their title deeds. 
 
Except for the Ga-Mabohlajane project, which is an urban claim, the restitution 
projects concern large areas and many people. They are often composed of several 
farms: in Mole-mole the five restitution projects cover eight different farms (Figure 
4). On average, a restitution project concerns 695 households and 3390ha. This yields 
an average figure of 4.9ha per household, which calls into questions the feasibility of 
such projects (since the carrying capacity in the region is estimated at 5ha/LSU12). 
The price paid for land is on average R391 per hectare and R4351 per household. 
Depending on what improvements are made to the land these figures can increase 
greatly (Table 7). 
                                                 
12
 Large Stock Unit. 
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Figure 4: Farms in Mole-mole affected by restitution claims 
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Table 7: Synthesis of the characteristics of Mole-mole’s land reform projects (restitution, SLAG and LRAD)  
 Restitution SLAG LRAD 
Number of projects 5 16 18 
Average area per project (ha) 
Average area/HH (ha/HH) 
3390 
4.9 
540 
7.9 
173 
26 
Average price per project (Rands) 
Average price per ha (Rands) 
1325490 
391 
774857 
2588 
674750 
5598 
Average number of HH per project 
Average number of beneficiaries per project 
% male/female 
% youth (<18) 
695 
4156 
-
1
 
-
1
 
68 
338 
64/36 
6 
7 
12 
74/26 
4 
Origin of beneficiaries 
 
 
* far 
* scattered places 
* 1 community 
* less far 
* 1 geographical area 
* part community 
* far/less far 
* 1 geographical area 
* limited group 
Acquisition procedure 
Time to process applications (years) 
Financial implications for beneficiaries 
claim (previously displaced) 
7.8 
none 
seller-driven 
2.9 
SLAG grants (# hh according 
to price) 
seller-/buyer-driven 
2.3 
LRAD grants (% of own 
contribution) + loan 
Type of acquired farm several farms entire or part of farm entire or part of farm 
Legal/ institutional structure * CPA 
* elected constitution 
* traditional tribal hierarchy 
 
* not always title deed 
* trust 
* elected constitution 
* community-elected 
management committee  
* title deed 
* CC2 
* no constitution 
* no hierarchy or 
management committee 
* title deed 
(1) no data available 
(2) close corporation. One LRAD project had the legal structure of a trust, subdivided into 13 sub-trusts. 
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1.1.2. SLAG projects 
 
The SLAG projects were mainly transferred between 1998 and 2000. The transfer 
process of these SLAG projects was less complex than that of the restitution claims 
for several reasons. Firstly, the SLAG projects often only involve one or just part of a 
farm, easing the negotiation process. Secondly, several previous owners decided to 
sell their land jointly and use land reform as an opportunity to sell. Several 
consultants, linked to the Department of Land Affairs, were employed to organise and 
process the projects, at administration and community level. For each project, groups 
of beneficiaries gathered together in numbers sufficient to cover the price of the land13 
and formed trusts. As a result, the beneficiaries in each group usually come from the 
same community often located relatively close to the project. As is the case with the 
restitution projects, the SLAG projects are managed by a committee, generally elected 
by the beneficiaries. Since these projects do not concern entire communities but rather 
groups of people, traditional hierarchies are generally not maintained. The trusts have 
also adopted constitutions pre-drafted by the Department of Land Affairs, and often 
implemented without any amendments. All SLAG project committees are in 
possession of their land’s title deeds. 
 
The SLAG projects involve on average 68 households and 540ha, representing 7.9ha 
per household (61% more than in the restitution cases, but still small according to the 
agricultural potential of the land). The price per hectare is R2588 (more than seven 
times higher than the restitution projects’) or R13700 per household (Table 7). 
 
The 16 assessed SLAG projects only involve eight farms (Figure 5). Most of the 
projects cover only part of a farm. One effect of this is the fact that some of the 
projects, at least initially, did not have the necessary infrastructure or access to 
specific resources such as water. With one exception, all the farms are located in the 
eastern part of Mole-mole, probably because several property owners sold their farms 
in succession in this area. 
                                                 
13
 Since every household is granted a SLAG grant of R16000, the size of the trust should be 
proportional to the price of the land (e.g. a piece of land costing R320 000 should have a trust of at 
least 20 households). Only Lehlabile Trust could not find enough beneficiaries to cover the purchase 
price of the farm and had to borrow money. In most cases, additional beneficiaries are generally 
included in a trust so that supplementary funds are available for infrastructure, implements, inputs etc. 
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Figure 5: Mole-mole farms involved in SLAG projects 
Land Reform and Development 
 
Postgraduate School of Agriculture and Rural Development 
 
 
32
1.1.3. LRAD projects 
 
LRAD projects differ markedly from restitution and SLAG projects, mainly because 
they focus on agricultural development. Smaller groups of interested beneficiaries 
acquire through LRAD farms that they have identified for agricultural development. 
Except for the Geluksfontein case (which is subdivided into several smaller trusts), 
close corporations (CC) were formed as legal entities to represent each project. Since 
each project generally involves a small group of people, the organization of these 
projects is simpler and no separate management committees are formed. Although 
these projects are young relative to the previous two types, they all have their title 
deeds. In contrast to the restitution and SLAG projects where no extra investment was 
needed from the beneficiaries, LRAD grants do not cover the purchase price of the 
farm and extra capital had to be borrowed. 
 
On average, the LRAD projects involve seven people and cover 173ha. This is 
approximately 26ha per beneficiary. The price at which the land was acquired in the 
framework of the LRAD programme is on average R5598 per ha or R56229 per 
beneficiary. These figures are significantly higher than those for the other two 
programmes.  
 
While LRAD projects are mainly characterized by small groups, the Geluksfontein 
farm was acquired by a larger group of people. In this case LRAD grants were 
aggregated on a SLAG principle, by grouping the number of people whose LRAD 
grants could cover the farm price (Table 7). 
 
As was the case with the SLAG projects, the LRAD projects mainly involve parts of 
farms. The 18 LRAD projects selected for investigation cover seven farms (Figure 6). 
Lack of infrastructure and specific resources (water mainly) is a frequent problem on 
the LRAD projects. 
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Figure 6: Mole-mole farms involved in LRAD projects 
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Although these three programmes are structurally very different and vary greatly in 
their objectives, their results and impact on development and livelihoods are to a 
certain extent the same: most projects are failures in the context of development. 
Further analysis will now be undertaken at project and beneficiary level, to understand 
the impact of these land reform projects. 
 
1.3. Negative trajectories of the land reform projects 
 
The most important observable fact is the overall negative trajectory of all the land 
reform projects in Mole-mole. This is demonstrated in the gross project income, 
which reflects the production level of a project. The land reform projects’ average 
gross farm income is R37147 per year (Table 7). Since there are 121 beneficiaries on 
average per project, this yields a figure of R307 gross income per beneficiary 
household per year. 
 
Large differences can be seen between the three types of land reform project. The 
average gross income of the restitution farms is R139600, of the SLAG projects only 
R30670 and on the LRAD projects R14444. These data are also relatively misleading, 
since the differences within each land reform programme are huge, as shown by the 
relatively high standard deviations (Table 7). An analysis according to income group 
(instead of land reform type group) thus seems more appropriate. 
 
The differences in income structure between types of land reform projects are 
interesting. None of the restitution projects produces agricultural products. Of the five 
restitution projects, two are urban claims, one relies on extra-agricultural activities 
(leasing to other farmers, etc.) and the other two have entirely collapsed. In contrast, 
the LRAD projects rely only on agricultural production (in accordance with the 
LRAD programme’s objective). The SLAG projects combine both. In all types of land 
reform, some projects make no income at all (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Gross project income per type of land reform project 
Land reform type Agricultural income 
(Rands) 
Other income 
(Rands) 
Total income 
(Rands) 
Restitution    
Average 0 139600 139600 
Standard deviation 0 279823 279823 
Maximum 0 638000 638000 
Minimum 0 0 0 
SLAG    
Average 22139 8531 30670 
Standard deviation 39435 12272 44548 
Maximum 141542 13080 143453 
Minimum 0 0 0 
LRAD    
Average 14444 0 14444 
Standard deviation 50361 0 50361 
Maximum 214000 0 214000 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Total    
Average 15749 21397 37147 
Standard deviation 42416 102111 108642 
Maximum 214000 638000 638000 
Minimum 0 0 0 
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As noted above, analysis by income group gives a more precise understanding of the 
situation. According to gross income, we subdivided Mole-mole’s land reform 
projects into three income groups: projects without income, projects with a gross 
income between R1 and R100000 and projects with a gross income above R100000 
(Table 9).  
 
Table 9: Mole-mole land reform projects by income group 
Gross farm income group 
 
R0 
(1st income group) 
R1-R100000  
(2nd income 
group) 
100000 <  
(3rd income 
group) 
Number of projects    
Total 20 (51.2%) 15 (38.5%) 4 (10.3%) 
Restitution 3 1 1 
SLAG 2 12 2 
LRAD 15 2 1 
Agricultural income (Rands)    
Average 0 11018 112236 
Standard deviation 0 10907 89752 
Maximum 0 26160 214000 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Other income (Rands)    
Average 0 9763.333 172012 
Standard deviation 0 14853.6 311553 
Maximum 0 60000 638000 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Total income (Rands)    
Average 0 20781.33 284249 
Standard deviation 0 13102.82 238232 
Maximum 0 60000 638000 
Minimum 0 5800 141542 
 
Of the 39 projects assessed, 20 (51.2% of the total projects covering 8786 ha) have no 
income. Specifically, these include two restitution projects, two SLAG projects and 
16 LRAD projects. The restitution and SLAG projects and two of the LRAD projects 
have entirely collapsed, while the other 13 LRAD project never started. Though 12 of 
these 13 LRAD projects began procedures in 2002 and the land was acquired about a 
year later, the beneficiaries only occupied the land in early 2005. Organisational 
problems still impede the projects. The thirteenth LRAD project was acquired by its 
present owners too recently, so no effective conclusions can be drawn from it (Table 
9). 
 
Of the 39 projects assessed, 15 (38.5%, representing an area of 9812 ha) generate an 
income between R1 and R100 000. These are mainly SLAG projects; only one is a 
restitution project and two are LRAD projects. The average gross income is R20781, 
with a maximum of R60 000 and a minimum of R5800. The large majority of these 
projects (11 of the 15) combine their own agricultural production with other non-
agricultural sources of income, in a ratio of approximately 55% to 45% on average. 
(These non-agricultural concerns are mostly leasing excess land to external people). 
All of these farms, though they do make a profit, show negative growth, with 
decreasing production levels. They are struggling to maintain or develop their 
agricultural production and, except for the LRAD farms, are trying to diversify their 
income (Table 9).  
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Of the 39 projects, only four (10.3%, representing 10125ha) have a gross income of 
more than R100 000; one is a restitution, two are SLAG and one an LRAD project. 
Though these projects are making profit, R100 000 is still a relatively low income 
when divided between the average number of beneficiaries (especially for the 
restitution and SLAG projects). However, these projects do seem to be able to 
maintain themselves; though all of them, except for the LRAD project, show 
decreased production since acquisition/settlement, they maintain production. Again, 
except for the LRAD project, the farms have diversified their production. Here non-
agricultural activities include running guest houses, forestry and game farming (Table 
9) rather than leasing out excess land. 
 
The most important observation here is the significant decrease of gross income per 
production unit compared to expected average production as stated in the projects’ 
business plans, which were based on the production of the farms before restitution or 
redistribution. Gross farm income, and thus production, has collapsed completely for 
the first income group, diminished ten-fold for the second income group and is only 
19.6% of what used to be produced for the third income group (Table 10). In total, 
land reform has led to an 89.5% decrease in gross income of the restituted or 
redistributed farms. 
 
Table 10: Gross farm income per ha by income group 
Gross income group Gross income per ha 
R0 R1-R100000 R100000 < 
Gross 
income 
reference * 
Average (Rands) 0 86 159 810 
Standard deviation 0 77 73 2132 
Maximum (Rands) 0 165 233 6350 
Minimum (Rands) 0 6 89 197 
* evaluated according to the production levels the farms reached before redistribution or restitution.  
 
A difference between the trends of the farms’ success is also apparent. The first 
income group shows collapse of farm income directly after acquisition. The second 
income group shows a strong decrease in the early phase followed by stabilization 
(although at a very low level) after approximately three years. The third income group 
shows on average a relatively slighter decrease until the third year, and then an 
increase (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Trend of average gross farm income by income group 
 
Explanations of these different trends in average gross farm income shown by the 
different income groups are explored in the next chapter. 
 
1.2. Disappointing impact of Mole-mole’s land reform for 
beneficiaries 
 
The generally negative trends shown by the farms logically mean that these projects 
have very little impact on and for land reform beneficiaries, particularly in light of the 
objectives and expectations of these land reform projects. Indeed, the results are even 
more alarming when gross farm income is analysed per household (Table 11). For the 
second and third income groups, gross income per household only represents 0.2% 
and 5.2% respectively compared to production before redistribution/restitution.  
 
Table 11: Gross farm income per household by income group 
Gross income group Gross income per HH 
R0 R1-R100000 R100 000 < 
Gross 
income 
reference * 
Average (Rands) 0 1359 19682 242600 
Standard deviation 0 1881 14551 145783 
Maximum (Rands) 0 6500 71333 542000 
Minimum (Rands) 0 42 1494 90000 
* Evaluated according to the production levels the farms reached before redistribution/restitution. 
 
If the decrease of gross income per household is not a surprise (since several 
households now occupy a farm that used to maintain only one or at least relatively 
few households), the extremity of the differences is alarming. Indeed, even the 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0 1 2 3 4 5
Year
A
v
e
ra
ge
 
gr
o
s
s
 
fa
rm
 
in
c
o
m
e
 
pe
r 
he
c
ta
re
 
(R
a
n
ds
)
groupe 1
groupe 2
groupe 3
Land Reform and Development 
 
Postgraduate School of Agriculture and Rural Development 
 
 
38
average gross income of R19682 per year, i.e. R1640 per month, for the upper income 
group is insufficient for most beneficiaries, considering production and other costs. 
 
The field observations confirm these findings. Firstly, only 45% of the official 
beneficiaries are currently engaged in the land reform projects and only 3.5% still 
benefit from the land reform projects (Table 12). In total, only 164 households 
(instead of 4691) presently benefit effectively from land reform in Mole-mole. 
 
Table 12: Beneficiaries of land reform in Mole-mole 
 Official beneficiaries 
of land reform 
projects 
Beneficiaries 
effectively engaging in 
land reform projects 
Beneficiaries 
presently benefiting 
from land reform 
projects 
Total number 4691 2110 164 
Average per project 108 71 5 
% of total official 
beneficiaries 100.0 45.0 3.5 
 
The small number of beneficiaries benefiting from land reform is especially evident in 
the restitution projects, in which only 0.4% of the official beneficiaries continue to 
benefit.14 In the SLAG projects, only 11.2% of beneficiaries are presently benefiting 
from the projects. This low percentage could be explained by the fact that many 
people become part of a SLAG project simply to make up the amount of necessary 
grants to acquire the land. LRAD, according to its objectives, has all its beneficiaries 
engaged in its projects and 22.5% continued to benefit at the time of the survey (Table 
13). 
 
Table 13: Beneficiaries of land reform in Mole-mole by type of project 
 Official 
beneficiaries of 
projects 
Beneficiaries 
effectively engaged 
in projects 
Beneficiaries 
presently benefiting 
from projects 
Restitution    
Total number 3477 1633 15 
Average per project 108 422 3 
% of official beneficiaries 100.0 46.9 0.4 
SLAG    
Total number 1094 357 122 
Average per project 68 24 8 
% of official beneficiaries 100.0 32.6 11.2 
LRAD    
Total number 120 120 27 
Average per project 7 7 2 
% of official beneficiaries 100.0 100.0 22.5 
 
Beneficiary participation also varies according to income group. However, even in the 
highest income group, only 8.6% of the total number of official beneficiaries 
participate actively in the project (Table 14).  
 
                                                 
14
 Note that the Marobala-O-Itsose restitution project is as yet not benefiting any beneficiaries, though 
it is operational and self-maintaining, in other words, a success story (see 1.3.3 of this chapter). 
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Table 14: Beneficiaries of land reform in Mole-mole by income group 
 Official 
beneficiaries of 
projects 
Beneficiaries 
effectively engaged 
in projects 
Beneficiaries 
presently benefiting 
from projects 
1st group: R0    
Total number 2358 2277 32 
Average per project 118 114 2 
% of official beneficiaries 100.0 96.5 1.3 
2nd group: R1-R100 000    
Total number 1752 259 82 
Average per project 116.8 18.5 5.9 
% of official beneficiaries 100.0 14.7 4.7 
3rd group: 100 000 <    
Total number 581 67 50 
Average per project 145.3 16 13 
% of official beneficiaries 100.0 11.5 8.6 
Comment: The high percentage of engaging beneficiaries for the first income group mainly results 
from the presence in this group of two urban claims (in which the beneficiaries remain all engaged). 
 
In the interviews, the identified land reform farms were estimated to employ 169 farm 
workers on a full-time basis.15 This number of land reform beneficiaries corresponds 
to the number of people previously employed on the farms. 
 
As well as failing to benefit the expected number of people, land reform is also having 
a much slighter impact on the (relatively few) beneficiaries’ lives. There are many 
reasons for this. Firstly 96.5% of the beneficiaries do not benefit from the land reform 
projects. Secondly, except for the LRAD projects (which mainly involve people 
previously or currently employed in salaried positions or as businessmen), a large 
portion of the beneficiaries still engaged and benefiting from the land reform projects 
were previously farm workers (the majority of these beneficiaries commented during 
the interviews that their working conditions have deteriorated). This accounts for 28% 
of the beneficiaries engaged in the projects (Figure 8). A further 25% or so are 
pensioners or benefiting from social grants, 4% work, are still working or are 
businessmen (this is mostly true for LRAD projects). Only 43% of the 164 
beneficiaries, those who were previously unemployed, say that land reform has 
improved their situation (notwithstanding the relatively poor conditions of 
employment and income on the projects).16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 An estimation of the temporary farm workers was not possible from the interview data. 
16
 It must be remembered that about 70% of the farm workers previously employed on the farms lost 
their jobs on restitution/redistribution. No further information concerning their present position is 
available (Have they found other jobs? Are they unemployed presently?) 
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Figure 8: Origin of beneficiaries presently engaged in land reform projects 
 
1.3. Mole-mole’s only three ‘success stories’ 
 
Applying the criteria for development, a successful land reform project would be: 
• a project that maintains or enhances its capacities and assets i.e. achieves long-
term maintenance and survival (even enhancement); 
• with beneficiaries who benefit from stocks and flows of food and income adequate 
for their basic human needs; 
• without undermining other livelihoods, or the potential livelihoods of the coming 
generations. 
 
According to these criteria, of the 39 land reform projects we assessed, only four 
projects can sustain their production and gross income at project and beneficiary level. 
On closer inspection, through visits to the projects and more detailed analysis of their 
production structures, one of the SLAG farms was found not to produce in a 
sustainable manner. While generating income only from blue gum tree cutting 
(mainly to make poles and charcoal), the beneficiaries are not replanting or investing 
the generated capital into other activities. They have already cut more than 70% of 
their trees, so this income generating activity will cease shortly. 
 
In the end, only three land reform projects can be called relative success stories. These 
include one restitution farm, one SLAG farm and one LRAD farm. 
 
1.3.1. The restitution success story 
 
The only restitution project that could maintain itself is managed as a company and 
has shown continuity in its income structure. No beneficiaries have as yet benefited 
from the project, but unless major problems occur, the project’s future appears 
promising. 
 
Acquisition of the farm 
 
This considerable area of 7148ha was claimed in 1996 and acquired on the 16th 
January 2004. It includes parts of five farms. The exact acquisition price was not 
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known by the interviewees. Though large in size, the land is owned by 427 
beneficiary households (a relatively small number compared to the other restitution 
projects). The beneficiaries were evicted from their land and scattered in the 1940s. 
Some of them presently come from Mpumalanga. 
 
The acquisition process was driven by two NGOs, namely Nkuzi and the Legal 
Resource Centre. With their help, a CPA was created and a management committee of 
ten members was elected for five years. According to the interviewees, no traditional 
hierarchy structure bound the members, facilitating fair and democratic elections. The 
CPA’s constitution was drafted by the beneficiaries, with the help of Nkuzi. 
 
Past and present activities 
 
After consultation, the beneficiaries decided to keep and to generate income from all 
existing activities on the farm. The interviewees said they decided this because too 
many people are involved to make subdividing it a viable option. 
 
In 2006, these activities generated an income of R680000. The activities consist 
mainly of renting out plots for grazing, farming and housing to two farmers, who were 
already active on the land. These farmers were given five-year leases for R84000 and 
R192000 per year respectively. Another 10 residential plots are hired out and 
managed by an estate agent. All infrastructure is maintained by the occupants. 
 
About 3000ha are available for the beneficiaries’ own projects. Last year’s profit was 
invested in a chicken project, currently being developed. 16 beneficiaries are being 
trained by the Primary Agriculture Education and Training Authority (PAETA), an 
organisation engaged in capacity building, to manage this project successfully from 
next year. 
 
Other plans include grazing land for a cattle project, with a 60 cow dairy farm; an eco-
tourism project with a game farm, and 130 food plots of 600m2 each for any interested 
land reform beneficiaries. Except from the food plots and perhaps some grazing, all 
these activities will be project-run. The projects require approximately R1500000, for 
which a grant, presumably through the Comprehensive Agricultural Support 
Programme (CASP), has been approved.  
 
Institutional framework and farm organisation 
 
The project is managed as a business. The primary objective is to employ people. 
Those who want to use the land have to pay for it. However, this created problems, 
especially with cattle owners or wealthy, established people with ‘unreasonable’ 
demands of the project. The interviewees reported that last year an illegal sub-group, 
some of whose members were not official beneficiaries, was created by the sub-
chairman, who misused last year’s income. This greatly delayed the development 
process. This sub-chairman is now facing charges brought against him by the project’s 
lawyer. The latter was appointed by the commissioner during the creation of the CPA, 
with the help of Nkuzi. The commissioner also intervenes as a mediator. 
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The institutional set-up is very strict but also transparent. Rules must be followed by 
the members, the commissioner and external institutions. The beneficiaries say the 
constitution, which they drafted, reflects their concerns and desires and therefore 
should be followed. 
 
However, because the project is run as a business, very few beneficiaries have 
benefited from it in the past 18 months. Even the management committee did not get 
paid for their work. Most of the people are presently surviving on community aid, 
pensions, packages and savings. Community dependence is thus very important. The 
main community lives close to the project (3km away). Some people are getting 
frustrated. 
 
Institutional integration 
 
From its earliest stages, the project has been institutionally well-integrated. Overseen 
by the Legal Resource Centre and Nkuzi, the beneficiaries have created a healthy 
basis for development.  
 
This stable institutional framework has, according to the interviewees, led to 
additional benefits. Firstly, the Commission has given positive feedback on the 
project, and involvement of the Department of Agriculture is benefiting the 
community as well. Secondly, the project has facilitated access to other institutions 
and support services (e.g. access to development grants, engagement with PAETA), 
thus leading to capacity building. Through PAETA, beneficiaries are presently 
developing their capacity and knowledge. 16 people are currently following a broiler 
course and additional courses such as entrepreneurship and vegetable-growing courses 
are planned. 
 
Nkuzi still monitors the project, as does an external lawyer. 
 
Problem identification 
 
The main problem affecting this project is low cash flow, combined with the 
beneficiaries’ high expectations. Little access to capital, and consequent slow 
development of projects could demotivate the beneficiaries. The absence of 
immediate benefits for those involved has led to frustration and conflict. 
 
Varying interest in and intentions for the land could also accentuate these conflicts. 
Hopefully firm monitoring of the self-drafted constitutions should help to overcome 
such issues. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the beneficiaries are not benefiting from the project yet, this farm maintains 
itself. Future opportunities should be created that engage more and more beneficiaries. 
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1.3.2. The SLAG success story 
 
This project is the only SLAG project that has been able to maintain itself. Having 
gone through numerous organisational problems, the project has shown continuity of 
production at project level while supporting a relatively high number of beneficiaries. 
 
Acquisition of the farm 
 
The farm was acquired in May 2001, at the end of a process initiated in 1998 when a 
consultant, linked to the Department of Land Affairs and the Department of 
Agriculture, approached the village of Sekgopo. 
 
Certain farmers from Mole-mole wanted to sell their property and had decided to use 
the SLAG programme to do so. These farmers contacted the relevant Departments, 
who then needed to identify enough beneficiaries to raise the purchase price with their 
SLAG grants and group these potential beneficiaries in legal entities. For this 
particular plot, evaluated at R1.8 million, 122 households, all from Sekgopo, gathered. 
A consultant was appointed to manage this process. 
 
The consultant found a local person, probably identified through the local Department 
of Agriculture, to help identify possible beneficiaries. He, with the help of the 
Department and the consultant, started grouping and organising interested inhabitants. 
A trust was created, a constitution developed and a management committee was 
formed. The committee has a two year term.17 
 
After three years of administrative procedures, the farm was finally transferred 
without problems. It had been productive and well maintained prior to the transfer. It 
was acquired by the beneficiaries just before harvest, from which a first income and 
thus available liquidity could be expected. 
 
Of the 122 beneficiaries, 87 effectively engaged at the farm. According to the 
interviewees, the 35 others, who are obviously not interested in active engagement, 
were involved purely for their SLAG grants. 
 
Past and present activities 
 
The 1392ha farm was fully operational and productive at the time of transfer. It had 
seven functioning boreholes producing enough water and employed 34 farm workers, 
who were all included in the beneficiary group. 
 
The farm’s overall production structure is still the same. The surplus SLAG grants 
(total R1.93 million, of which only R1.8 million was needed to purchase the farm) 
was used to acquire implements (two tractors, one bakkie and one trailer). A 
production loan of R190000 was used to purchase 60 cows and three bulls. 
 
                                                 
17
 Although supposedly democratic, this election suffered several irregularities, identified during the 
interviews.  
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The business plan, based on the previous owner’s production, stated that a yearly 
gross farm revenue of R622000 was expected. With a cost structure of R79 000, a net 
farm revenue of R543000 was estimated per year. An internal rate of return (IRR) of 
22% was estimated. 
 
Although the production structure is still the same, the productivity is slowly 
decreasing every year. In 2004, the gross farm revenue was R143453, which 
represents only 25% of the estimated revenue (Table 15). 
 
Table 15: Details of the farm’s production and income for 2004 
Product Quantity Estimated yearly gross farm 
revenue (Rands) 
Agricultural production   
   Avocado 15ha 63870 
   Orchard guava - 3340 
   Guava 3.2ha 29534 
   Orchard avocado - 1524 
   Cattle 60 producing 25600 
Non-agricultural activities    
   Guest house  4250 
   Weaving  1650 
   Nursery  37705 
   Wattle plantations 5ha - 
   Blue gum plantations 52ha 1579 
TOTAL  169052 
 
The production costs are also much higher than expected (Table 16). 
 
Table 16: Farm’s production costs for 2004 
Cost structure Production costs (Rands) 
Labour 60800 
Electricity 30000 
Inputs (fertilisers, etc) 60000 
Other (petrol, etc) 6000 
TOTAL 156800 
 
After the production costs are covered, very little remains to reimburse the borrowed 
capital. Last year only R15000 of the R54000 was repaid. 
 
Institutional framework and farm organisation 
 
The ten member management committee encountered severe problems, and 
management difficulties, organisational problems and irregularities which obliged the 
management committee to be dismissed. Among the problems was misuse of revenue 
(in particular from the first harvest) and abuse of the farm’s assets (infrastructure, 
resources) for personal benefit (through internal and external individuals). These 
fraudulent activities cost the farm most of its capital and caused its infrastructure to 
deteriorate. This caused serious conflict among the beneficiaries. 
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According to the project’s constitution, all beneficiaries working on the farm are paid 
R300/month (representing an aggregate monthly cost of approximately R25000). 
These participants have the status of farm workers (though they participate in all 
decision making). Together with misuse of the farm’s income, this high wage cost has 
quickly drained the project’s liquid assets, such that the project can no longer pay the 
people. The result has been that most of the beneficiaries living on the farm left with 
the first management committee. The 28 households that remain say these people are 
now disinterested in working, owning and living on the farm.  
 
A new committee has been elected by the 28 remaining households. To avoid 
previous problems, more transparent and equitable structures were implemented. 
Book-keeping and presentation of results are compulsory. Decisions are presently 
made through a vote by all those remaining on the farm. According to some of the 
interviewees, this process delays effective and efficient decision-making. 
 
Though the most important organisational problems seem to have been solved, their 
effects still cause conflict. Some interviewees blame the constitution, in which the 
title deed is under the name of all beneficiaries, including those who do not engage 
actively in the project. These beneficiaries, according to the interviewees, regularly 
create conflict (especially during or after harvest time), and also cause problems when 
legal/juridical issues arise. For example, accessing a loan can become a problem when 
the names on the title deed do not correspond with those of the loan seekers. No 
process is in place to amend the constitution, which the interviewees say was imposed 
on them in the first place. 
 
An external monitoring structure was supposed to be implemented, but has never 
materialised. The previous owner has taken the role of external mediator. 
 
The initial group of 87 beneficiaries was composed of former farm workers, 
pensioners and unemployed people from Sekgopo. According to the interviewees, 
most of these people were without plans for the future, especially the pensioners and 
those who had been unemployed for a long time. 
 
Institutional integration 
 
The interviewees explained that the farm maintains a relatively large number of 
institutional contacts, which they say are necessary to compensate for a lack of 
government support. The interviewees say that all levels of government, in their 
experience, do not seem able to deliver the support and services they need, and in fact 
only impede the development of the project. 
 
The farm works with several private institutions, including import/export consultants 
(ECI Africa), transporters (e.g. Moketsi Transporters) and retail markets. The project 
also maintains a good relationship with private veterinary services. All these 
institutional linkages were developed by the previous owner of the land. 
 
In addition, the farm is a member of several local associations, such as the 
Soekmekaar Farmers’ Association, which was developed in cooperation with the 
relevant departments to help with internal problems (e.g. conflicts) and external 
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representation (e.g. liaising with government institutions). However, the interviewees 
say this Association is not always very effective or representative; sometimes it is 
even a source of problems itself. The farm is also a member of a local farmers 
association (comprised of five local farms) who share implements and labour. The 
project is presently working closely with the previous owner, who besides being an 
external mediator also acts as a technical advisor. 
 
Problem identification 
 
Three institutional problems were identified during the interviews.  
 
The first problem concerns the power structures present within the group since the 
early development of the trust. The structural organisation of the trust, developed by 
previously and currently appointed hierarchies, controls the entire functioning of the 
trust. In its current form, this structure has no means to combat corruption, 
mismanagement and misuse. No external conflict resolution system is in place and an 
external mediator has only recently been appointed. 
 
A second problem concerns the project’s isolation. As was the case with the first 
successful project discussed, this project needs more institutional contacts. The 
relevant government-run structures lack capacity and resources (whether knowledge, 
manpower or will) and suffer from over-complex bureaucratic processes. Wider 
external collaboration would also, according to the interviewees, lead to better control 
and monitoring of the project. 
 
The last problem is linked to the two previous ones, and concerns the lack of an 
adapted internal organisational and institutional framework, which results from the 
structure of the project’s constitution and title deed. The current structure includes 
non-active beneficiaries and leads to ineffective collective action, decision-making, 
interaction with institutions and access to services and support. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This project, which began with settlement of a fully productive farm, almost failed 
through mismanagement and misuse of resources. Only a strong trust structure and 
external monitoring prevented the project from entirely collapsing. 
 
The projected future for this farm thus remains positive, as it should provide an 
income for a relatively large number of beneficiaries with the status of salaried 
employees. However, so far this instance of land reform has not had an overall 
positive impact, since the farm now benefits fewer people than before the transfer. 
This is all the more important since the production of the farm is decreasing. 
 
1.3.3. The LRAD success story 
 
This project is the only one which sustainably maintains and even increases its 
production. It provides income to owners and farm workers; however, because it is a 
LRAD project it only has three beneficiaries with their respective employees. 
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Acquisition of the farm 
 
This LRAD project concerns a farm of 916ha. The farm, transferred for R760000, was 
acquired on the 1st May 2002 by three brothers from Thohoyandou. To a LRAD grant 
of R260000 they added a Land Bank loan of R500000. The three brothers are 
relatively well-established financially (one was an independent businessman, one a 
medical doctor and one a surveyor), which made them able to access this loan. 
 
The businessman-brother worked for the government for more than 20 years and then 
invested in successful independent activities, in particular a garage. He also bought a 
plot of 7ha near Thohoyandou. He and his two brothers later decided to buy a private 
farm on which they would develop commercial farming activities. After they 
identified a suitable farm, they registered a close corporation (CC) as a legal entity 
grouping the three of them, so that they qualified for LRAD grants. The title deed is in 
the name of the CC. 
 
Past and present activities 
 
The farm had been neglected for several years, probably since 2000. Though the 
infrastructure and production structures were in a dilapidated condition, most of them 
were still present. The farm price included previous improvements and major 
implements. The farm has plenty of water: several boreholes yield enough water even 
for irrigation. 
 
The farm used to export granadillas (1ha, under irrigation), had 1200 fully producing 
avocado trees and 43 heads of cattle. It was a self-maintaining commercial farm. 
 
Since acquiring the farm, the three brothers have worked to revitalise it, mainly using 
their own funds. Relying on their income and salaries in other sectors, they inject 
large amounts of capital into the farm, between R5000 and R15000 (R5000 each) per 
month, they say. At the time of the interview, an application for a CASP grant of 
R300000 was being processed by the Department of Agriculture. 
 
After three years of operation, the farm began to be productive and profitable. All 
existing production structures, namely granadillas (for which they took over the 
export permit), avocados and cattle husbandry have been reactivated. In addition, the 
brothers have started an irrigation scheme for 5ha of cabbage and are building a pig 
farm and putting up a 13km game fence. Most of these investments came from their 
own capital, except a R100000 production loan used to purchase additional cattle (the 
farm now has 123 cows and 80 calves).  
 
The gross revenue of the farm is estimated at R214000 per year (Table 17). 
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Table 17: Estimation of the farm’s gross income 
Product Quantity Estimation gross farm revenue (Rands) 
Avocado 1200 trees 9000 
Granadilla 1ha 70000 
Cattle 123 producing 120000 
Cabbage 5ha 15000 
pigs - - 
TOTAL  214000 
 
Table 18 presents an estimation of the farm’s production costs. 
 
Table 18: Estimated production costs 
Cost structure Estimated production costs (Rands) 
Hired labour 65000 
Electricity 54000 
Inputs (fertilisers, etc) 18000 
Other (petrol, etc) 10000 
TOTAL 147000 
 
Taking into account the annual repayments of R60000, the farm presently has a net 
revenue of R7000. As it is thus not yet profitable, external sources of income are 
necessary. 
 
Institutional framework and farm organisation 
 
The farm is a CC owned by the three brothers. Though only one of them manages the 
farm full-time, they all make decisions together. 
 
At this stage, the farm manager does not earn a salary for his work on the farm. 
However, it has been decided that in future he will receive a larger portion of the 
benefits. His full-time presence on the farm does not compromise his permanent 
income, since his petrol station is operated by a manager. 
 
The farm has six permanent labourers and eight temporary ones, all of whom were 
farm workers before, some employed by the previous owner of the farm. None of 
these workers live on the farm any longer. They come in every day from the three 
townships located between 3 and 7km from the farm. The workers are picked up and 
dropped off every workday. The owners say they avoid having people on the farm for 
privacy reasons, and out of respect for their workers’ private lives. 
 
Though the owners do not feel threatened by the local community, they say that too 
much contact could lead to impositions by the community. Good relationships are 
nevertheless essential; the owners maintain relationships with the traditional 
authorities and sponsor local activities and events (e.g. local football club). 
 
Institutional integration 
 
The farm manager works closely with the Department of Agriculture, the 
representatives of which he meets at least once a month (especially to vaccinate 
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cattle). The owners are in contact with the Land Bank, to which they still owe money. 
Beyond this, they have no further interaction with the public sector. The manager said 
that though the Department of Agriculture has relatively good information about 
livestock, in general they lack knowledge and capacity to support farmers. 
 
The three brothers rely on various other associations and institutions for their 
information. They are members of the Avocado’s Growers Association (on which 
they depend for information concerning the import/export of their avocados) and of 
the national cattle association for emerging farmers (from which they get necessary 
technical information). They source many agricultural inputs from NTK-co-operative, 
though they are not members, and are in regular contact with a veterinary from Louis 
Trichard. They also maintain close relationships with the surrounding white farmers 
(though not with the previous owner, who has left the region). The brothers say they 
find their relationships with the white farmers a useful way to access technical 
information. 
 
As a small private enterprise this project has no problems with institutional access. 
Instead, they say they need more assistance, especially in marketing and training. As 
emerging farmers, they feel isolated. They do not produce enough to access markets 
individually, and struggle to obtain the necessary information for running a 
commercial farm.  
 
Problem identification 
 
The farm manager argues that farming is difficult. He says farming is a lifestyle, 
rather than just a job. To succeed, one has to recognise the farm as his/her place of 
work and life. According to him, not everybody is interested in farming or wants to 
live on a farm. Motivation and interest, he says, are the main ingredients for success 
and are often lacking with land reform beneficiaries, who – according to him - only 
take advantage of an opportunity and get free access to land. 
 
The main problems faced by this project concern the accessibility of both information 
and skills. The owners say the Department of Agriculture lacks resources, especially 
to help farmers like themselves, who operate between subsistence and commercial 
farming. They say much of the available information is not adapted to their activities, 
leaving them feeling isolated. 
 
They suggest the creation of similar projects near to them would be helpful. Co-
operation, according to the farmers, will only function effectively between the same 
type of farms with the same interests.  
 
Conclusion 
 
With the help of substantial external financial means (from other sectors), this land 
reform project has managed to develop the farm incrementally. These external sources 
of income are necessary to maintain the farm and to manage it commercially.  
 
Athough the project is confronted to isolation and a lack of skills and information, the 
farm’s trajectory remains positive, and provides an income for a few employees. 
Land Reform and Development 
 
Postgraduate School of Agriculture and Rural Development 
 
 
50
However, considered as land reform, this project has not had a positive impact on the 
beneficiaries and employees. Before acquiring the land the beneficiaries were full-
time entrepreneurs or had fixed salaries; their situation has not changed, rather their 
activities have just diversified. The farm workers were previously irregular salaried 
labourers and still are. 
 
2. Reasons for failures to link land reform to development 
 
The results of our study are dramatic: only three out of 39 projects are considered to 
be successful. Production on land reform projects has decreased on average by 89.5%, 
and only 164 beneficiaries are presently profiting from the redistributed/restituted 
farms. These results are particularly alarming since approximately twice the number 
of farms will be restituted shortly and others are to be redistributed in the coming 
years.  
 
The negative spiral into which most of the Mole-mole land reform projects seem to be 
trapped must be broken. Solutions need to be found to revive these projects and to 
avoid similar failures in future redistributions/restitutions of farms.  
 
Breaking this negative trend must begin with understanding the reasons why land 
reform seems not to lead to development. This section of the report describes in detail 
the reasons identified in our case studies for the failure of the land reform projects in 
Mole-mole. Four main clusters of reasons can be identified: (1) factors that make land 
reform projects unfeasible, (2) inappropriate institutional structures, (3) isolation and 
lack of collective action, and (4) administrative problems.  
 
2.1. Factors that make land reform projects unfeasible 
 
These factors can be divided into three major subgroups: (1) economic difficulties to 
develop viable agricultural activities, (2) inherent economic unfeasibility and (3) 
acquisition of unsuitable land. 
 
2.1.1. Economic difficulties to develop viable agricultural activities 
 
Within the present economic conditions, is land reform possible in South Africa? This 
question can be approached first in the framework of LRAD. 
 
As detailed in the previous section, we know that the price for a ha of land in Mole-
mole is on average R3400. With the average LRAD grants contracted, this R3400 is 
reduced to R2445 per ha (Figure 9). Average gross farm income per ha is R810. 
Considering that production costs represent about 65% of gross farm income in arid 
environments (Swart, 1999), the disposable farm income per ha is expected to be 
R283. For long-term loans (20 years) at an interest rate of 10%, which are the 
conditions most LRAD beneficiaries get from the Land Bank (Land Bank, 2002), 
annual reimbursements can be expected of R399 and R287 respectively for the lands 
purchased without or with LRAD grants. In both cases, net farm income will be 
negative. 
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 Without grants  LRAD 
grants 
Price of land per ha (Rands)       3400     2445 
Gross farm income (Rands)  810  
 
Production costs (%) 
  
65 
 
 
Disposable farm income (Rands) 
  
283 
 
 
Annual reimbursement (Rands) 
 
        399 
 
 
    287 
 
 
Net farm income (Rands) 
 
 
       -116 
  
 
            -4 
 
Figure 9: Evaluation of the net farm income in Mole-mole 
 
This implies that under actual economic conditions (land prices, farm profits, bank 
conditions), living on the land is not economically feasible for most beneficiaries. The 
situation in actuality is often worse, for example situations wherein beneficiaries take 
out additional loans (e.g. for infrastructural development), which then have to be 
repaid. 
 
This is the situation with the LRAD projects. In the restitution and SLAG cases, under 
normal conditions, land is acquired without capital input by beneficiaries. Only one 
SLAG project in our sample had to take a loan to buy land since it was unable to 
gather the necessary number of beneficiaries in time. Therefore, in theory, restitution 
and SLAG projects should be more economically viable. 
 
However, in actual practice the restitution and SLAG programmes only deal with the 
transfer of land. Any development of this land (production or infrastructure) after 
transfer requires access to additional capital. In contrast to the findings of many 
studies dealing with communal property and access to capital (e.g. Anim & Van 
Schalkwyk, 1996; Graham & Darroch, 2001), we found that many of these projects 
can access capital, through two major channels, loans and SLAG grants. Of the 39 
projects investigated, 28 had access to capital (Table 19). We found that capital access 
issues only concern restitution projects, mainly caused through institutional 
incoherencies (cf hereafter). Therefore, the question now becomes one of actual 
feasibility: can a farm that supported one or perhaps a few farming households now 
support 199 households, the average for a restitution or SLAG project? 
 
Table 19: Access to capital for Mole-mole’s land reform projects by type 
 Restitution SLAG LRAD 
 
Total 
 
Total number of projects 5 16 18 39 
Projects accessing loans 0 6 8 14 
Average amount of loans (Rands) - 99 300 448 500 273 900 
Projects with surplus capital from grant 0 15 1 16 
Average surplus capital (Rands) - 201 500 678 000 - 
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2.1.2. Inherent economic unfeasibility  
 
Taking into consideration the carrying capacity of the area (5ha/LSU), it becomes 
clear, as shown in Table 20, that few projects are feasible considering the number of 
households they are intended to support. This is even the case for some of the LRAD 
projects, only three of which have an area per household above 100ha. 
 
Table 20: Redistributed/restituted land per household 
 Restitution SLAG LRAD Total 
Average surface per household (ha) 6.2 8.5 49.4 27.1 
Standard deviation 6.3 6.7 90.9 64.9 
Maximum (ha) 16.7 21.9 305 30.5 
Minimum (ha) 3.7 2.6 1.5 1.5 
 
With a gross farm income of R810 per ha, and factoring in the number of ha 
redistributed/restituted and the number of beneficiary households, a disposable 
income of R2992 per year per household is achievable (if labour costs are not 
considered, which are estimated at 20% of gross farm income; Swart, 1999). If the 
beneficiaries are remunerated, which is the case in the majority of the projects (on 
average R300 per month), the net project income will be negative (even before 
repayment of the annuities). Economic unfeasibility is thus a general factor. 
 
However, the objectives of the restitution and SLAG programmes are not to create 
viable commercial farms, but to make a small subsistence farming sector supporting 
the rural poor possible (Department of Land Affairs, 1997). Yet not even subsistence 
has been achieved. Due to the underlying principles of the programmes, most land 
reform projects are relatively isolated: on average 29km separates the land reform 
project from the beneficiaries’ places of origin. This considerably increases 
production costs and makes it impossible for the majority of the people, particularly 
the poor, to benefit from these lands (Table 21).  
 
Table 21: Distance between project and beneficiaries’ original community 
Distance from land reform project to 
beneficiaries’ community 
Restitution SLAG LRAD Total 
Average (km) 48 27 24 29 
Standard deviation 31 13 39 29 
Maximum (km) 100 45 100 100 
Minimum (km) 10 10 5 5 
 
LRAD projects are less affected by these problems, since firstly, the objective of these 
projects is commercial production and secondly, they are based on the willing buyer-
willing seller principle, where beneficiaries identify land for potential purchase. This 
is not the case of restitution or, in the Mole-mole municipality, of SLAG projects, 
which are more seller-driven. 
 
2.1.3. Acquisition of unsuitable land 
 
The survey has also shown that the land acquired for the projects is not always 
suitable for development, particularly agricultural development. 
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Though this is not often the case with restituted land (on which the communities lived 
before being evicted and which therefore often includes several farms), it is often true 
of redistributed land. Some researchers and NGOs claim that only less productive land 
is transferred through land reform programmes (NLC, 2001). The present survey 
confirms this suggestion, and shows that it is often due to the subdivision of projects. 
Usually farms are subdivided into different projects to prevent certain groups of 
beneficiaries’ acquiring total control of particular projects.18 The result is that several 
projects are located on parts of farms, often without basic infrastructure such as access 
to resources (e.g. water) or roads. Of the 39 projects, 27 are located on part of a farm, 
19 lacked basic infrastructure (housing, electricity lines, roads, etc.) and 16 had 
problems with water (Table 22). 
 
Table 22: Characteristics of acquired land 
 Restitution SLAG LRAD Total 
Number of projects 5 16 18 39 
Land is part of subdivided farm 0 11 16 27 
Land without basic infrastructure  0 5 14 19 
Land with acute water problems 0 4 12 16 
 
The difficulty of the working and living conditions on the farms is confirmed by the 
small proportion of beneficiaries willing to actually live on the farms. Only 51 of the 
164 beneficiaries currently involved with the farms said they would be willing to live 
on the farms (Table 23). Most said that life on the farm is too isolated or difficult. 
Except for the beneficiaries of the three bigger LRAD projects,19 all stressed that they 
need to be close to their communities, their social and cultural environments and their 
family life.20 Most also noted that life on the farm would not be possible without links 
with their communities.  
 
Table 23: Willingness of beneficiaries to live on the farms 
 Restitution SLAG LRAD Total 
Number of beneficiaries involved in the farms 15 122 27 164 
Beneficiaries involved in the farms willing to 
live there 6 34 11 51 
% of beneficiaries involved in the farms willing 
to live there 40.0 27.8 40.7 31.1 
 
These results are confirmed by an additional survey carried out in the neighbouring 
communities of Sekgopo and Makgato (Perret, Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2005). This 
survey showed that less than 0.5% of the more than 300 respondents said they were 
willing to live on a land reform farm. These observations corroborate Anseeuw’s 
(2004) findings. 
 
                                                 
18
 The survey also suggested that this process of subdividing is also sometimes initiated by the previous 
owner, who is then able to sell different parts separately, and probably increase the overall price. 
19
 These three represent a more affluent social group, who do not need community aid for their 
livelihoods. 
20
 Most stressed that all the structures they need are located in their community of origin. Important 
structures include schools, clinics, social and cultural groups and community aid. 
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2.2. Inappropriate institutional structures at project level 
 
In many of the assessed projects, interviewees were concerned by the inappropriate 
institutional structures at project level (this was not seen as a problem in the three 
LRAD projects with fewer beneficiaries, organized in CCs). 
 
Although somewhat intertwined, three institutional problems operating at different 
levels can be distinguished. These are misuse of power structures, inappropriate legal 
structures and lack of disciplinary and monitoring structures. 
 
2.2.1. Mismanagement and misuse of power structures 
 
These problems can usually be traced back to pre-settlement organizational 
procedures. These procedures are often initiated externally, especially in SLAG 
projects, by or through the Departments of Agriculture or Land Affairs or an 
appointed consultant. In addition, the procedures are often based on existing power 
structures within the community (which can be linked to traditional hierarchical 
structures). The initiating people or bodies organize the potential beneficiaries into 
CPAs or trusts, usually following existing power structures. Besides promoting what 
Botha (2001) calls opportunistic behaviour, this also results in apathy among a large 
portion of the beneficiaries; nevertheless, they join the group to support the structure 
to which they belong. 
 
The management committee, which is generally elected, represents and is mainly built 
up around the community’s power structure. Symptoms of this are evident in the 
adoption of a constitution that is pre-drafted and only amended, if at all, by those with 
power in this particular structure. 
 
These inherited structures can create a hierarchical system in which the leaders 
control process, functioning and structure. This opens opportunities for illegal 
practices and misuse of assets by those in power, on behalf of a minority of 
beneficiaries. This was most often seen on SLAG farms, but also occurred on one 
restitution farm (Table 24).  
 
Table 24: Illegal practices and misuse of assets on Mole-mole’s land reform 
farms by type 
 Restitution SLAG LRAD Total 
Number of assessed farms 5 16 18 39 
Number of farms affected by illegal 
practices and misuse of assets 1 10 0 11 
 
Most of these farms (except one) belong to the first and second income groups and 
suffered a quick collapse of production and gross income (Table 8). The LRAD 
projects mostly escaped these problems because they are characterized by more 
transparent procedures and are individually managed. 
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2.2.2. Inappropriate institutional and legal structures 
 
Land reform projects are often characterized by inappropriate institutional and legal 
arrangements. During the implementation process, two major types of constitutions 
tend to be adopted, representing either the entire group/trust (with the title deed in the 
names of all the beneficiaries) or the management committee (with the title deed in 
the names of the management committee members). Both have led to problems.  
 
Inherited power structures, discussed above, and money-raising tactics that end up 
grouping disinterested people as beneficiaries can both cause the legal entity formed 
to represent the project to differ vastly from the actual body of active beneficiaries 
and from the elected management committee members. The problems this creates are 
worsened by decreasing production and revenue possibilities, which cause 
beneficiaries to leave the projects. In the end only a very small number of 
beneficiaries live on the farm; or the beneficiaries officially involved in the project are 
not actually active in it or part of the management committee; or the management 
committee is changed without the legal representation of the project’s being adapted. 
This results in the legal representation of the project no longer matching the profile of 
beneficiaries effectively dealing with the project. 
 
An early consequence of such discrepancies is disruption of access to services, 
particularly financial services. Since the names on the title deed often do not 
correspond with those applying for credit, for example, access is refused. A second 
major problem is decision-making, with decisions either made by people no longer 
active in the project, which can lead to mismanagement and unfairness, or not made at 
all, since the legally empowered people are absent or insufficient in number. 
 
The representatives of about 22 of the 39 projects said that their constitutions and 
legal structures are unsatisfactory and that they want to amend them (Table 25). 
Nevertheless, of these 22, only three said this would be possible. The others claimed 
that opposition, mainly arising because of previous power structures, would make 
amendments impossible. The six LRAD farms claiming to be limited by their 
constitution are projects acquired from a subdivided farm under the legal status of a 
trust. 
 
Table 25: Mole-mole’s land reform projects, by type, which are limited by 
constitution or legal structure 
 Restitution SLAG LRAD Total 
Number of assessed farms 5 16 18 39 
Number of projects limited by constitution or 
legal structure 3 13 6 22 
 
Again, the majority of the projects affected come from the first and second income 
groups. Two projects from the third income group, both SLAG projects, have similar 
problems (Table 26). 
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Table 26: Mole-mole’s land reform projects, by income group, which are 
limited by constitution or legal structure 
Gross income group 
 
R0 R1-R100000 > R100000 
Number of assessed farms 20 15 4 
Number of farms limited by constitution or 
legal structure 10 10 2 
 
2.2.3. Lack of conflict-resolution systems and mediation 
 
The problems with power and legal issues described above lead to important internal 
and internal-external conflicts. These conflicts have various effects on the functioning 
of the projects: 
• In four cases, the project collapsed entirely, the farms were vandalized and all 
assets stolen.  
• In most cases, planned tasks were obstructed, reduced their sense of responsibility 
and demotivated beneficiaries. 
• In a few cases, obstruction and vandalism were committed by a few individuals 
who either were excluded at the beginning of the project or left during difficult 
periods. 
 
Very little attention has been given to conflict resolution systems. Only two farms 
have conflict resolutions systems in place, one a SLAG farm which uses an external 
mediator (the former owner), and the other a restitution farm which uses an externally 
appointed lawyer. The Soekmekaar Farmers Association was recently created by the 
Department of Agriculture to tackle this issue, by grouping approximately 15 of the 
land reform projects. The legitimacy of this effort is somewhat questionable, since the 
Department of Agriculture initiated the legal structures which subsequently led to 
some of the conflicts. 
 
2.3. Lack of collective action and institutional isolation 
 
From the survey results, the isolation of the projects is evident. Of the 39 projects 
assessed, four have no contact with any institution (Table 27), namely one restitution 
project and three SLAG projects (Table 28). None of these projects generates income. 
 
Table 27: Mole-mole’s land reform farms’ access to institutions  
Assessed farms without access to  
Public 
institution 
Private 
institution 
Associative 
institutions 
Any 
institution 
Number of farms (n=39) 4 27 21 4 
 
It should be noted that, of the 39 projects, only 12 have any dealings with private 
institutions. Nearly all the LRAD projects (16 of 18), 60% of the restitution projects 
and 50% of the SLAG projects are without such contact. Again, the large majority of 
these projects generate no income (eight come from the second income group; Table 
28). Significantly, the majority of these projects are based on subdivided farms 
(though not the restitution projects). 
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Table 28: Mole-mole’s land reform farms’ access to institutions by type  
Assessed farms without access to  
Public 
institution 
Private 
institution 
Associative 
institutions 
Any 
institution 
Restitution (n=5) 1 3 2 1 
SLAG  (n=16) 3 8 4 3 
LRAD (n=18) 0 16 15 0 
 
Only 21 projects are part of associative institutions (professional associations, local 
associations, etc.). Again, most of the LRAD projects are not part of such associations 
while, in contrast, most SLAG projects are. This is possibly due to the proximity of 
the SLAG projects to Soekmekaar, since they all began in a grouped sale of farms. 
These projects have strong relationships with each other, since in addition to their 
geographical proximity they all have beneficiaries who come from Sekgopo. These 
beneficiaries have formed two associations, namely 
• the Soekmekaar Farmers Association, consisting of about 15 projects gathered by 
the Department of Agriculture, which deals mainly with conflict resolution and 
access to public or private institutions; and 
• a Local Farmers Association consisting of five SLAG projects that share 
implements and labour. 
 
Table 29: Mole-mole’s land reform farms’ access to institutions by group 
Assessed farms without access to  
Public 
institution 
Private 
institution 
Associative 
institutions 
Any 
institution 
1st income group (R0) (n=20) 3 19 17 3 
2nd income group (R1-R100000) (n=15) 1 8 4 1 
3rd
 income group (R100000 <) (n=4) 0 0 0 0 
 
Significantly, all the third income group projects are members of the three identified 
institutional groupings. A positive correlation between farm income/production and 
institutional links is thus evident. Although most of the assessed projects are in 
contact, very little effort is made either by the projects themselves or by the 
coordinating institutions (e.g. the Department of Agriculture) to promote collective 
action. Some interviewees say power structures at intra- and inter-community levels 
could be the reason for this. Any collective action and support thus arises not from the 
organization of farms but from communities. The community is still an important 
security network for a project, at both beneficiary and project levels. 
 
Lastly, very little collective action is evident between former owners or surrounding 
farmers and beneficiaries. Such collaboration was seen in only two projects.  
 
2.4. Administrative problems  
 
The activities of the local departments are not always appreciated by the beneficiaries. 
Three main reasons for this are administrative complexity, the limited capacity mainly 
of local departments and the opacity of official processes. 
 
Firstly, the relevant administrative procedures are long, difficult and often costly for 
the beneficiaries. The extended period between lodging a demand for land and actual 
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acquisition by the beneficiaries (some of whom still do not have their title deeds) is a 
good example (Table 30) (though many other problems can also delay the process). 
 
Table 30: Average period between claim and acquisition for Mole-mole’s land 
reform projects by type 
 Restitution SLAG LRAD Average 
Period between claim and transfer (years) 7.8 2.9 2.3 3.5 
 
This not only makes the government a second-choice negotiator, as Aliber and 
Mokoena (2000) indicate, but also contributes to demoralisation of potential 
beneficiaries and deterioration of production structures (lack of maintenance of 
implements, land and perennial crops).  
 
In addition to the complexity of administrative procedures, personnel problems also 
impact on the projects. Issues include lack of staff, high staff turn-over and lack of 
appropriate knowledge and skills among staff. Although Hedden-Dunkhorst and 
Mollel (1999) show that the number of officers in the field did not decrease, the 
number and the diversity of people and tasks that these officers have to support have 
increased. Interviewees complained about new agents who come in with no 
knowledge or experience of the various processes. Many beneficiaries also said the 
support officers also lack practical experience in the field and relevant knowledge (the 
one exception is knowledge concerning animal husbandry). 
 
Lastly, the activities of the local administration are not transparent. Several activities 
are implemented without consultation with the beneficiaries. The local personnel’s 
engagement in certain duties and activities is questionable, since they often implement 
and then monitor the very same activities, projects or programmes. Since they are 
involved in the land reform projects from their inception, these personnel can easily 
become part of the implemented power structures and benefit directly from their 
position. External monitoring is almost totally lacking. 
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IV. Linking land reform to development: conclusions 
and recommendations 
 
The results are clear: of the 39 land reform projects assessed, only three are 
sustainable, as they maintain (or increase) their production and generate income for a 
certain number of beneficiaries. The large majority of the land reform beneficiaries, 
i.e. 4527 out of 4691 households (96.5%), do not benefit at all from the land reform 
projects. Furthermore, production has dropped by an average of 89.5% on the land 
reform farms and jobs have been lost. 
 
Nevertheless, due to the historical bias and socio-political importance of land 
distribution in South Africa, land reform must and will continue. In Mole-mole, for 
example, another 24 farms will be restituted over the coming years and other 
redistribution projects will likely be implemented. 
 
Ways of overcoming the failure of land reform projects must urgently be identified. 
Some recommendations, which should lead to discussion and further reflection, can 
be made based on our description of Mole-mole’s land reform projects and analysis of 
the main reasons for their failure. Accordingly, the first section discusses the necessity 
of a structural renewed dual land reform combing farming on communally and 
privately owned land. The second part deals with necessary changes to institutional 
structures. The third part discusses possible ways to enhance collective action and 
avoid isolation. The fourth part explains some governance issues, including control 
and monitoring systems. This will, finally, bring us to the conclusion of this report. 
 
1. The need for a structural renewed dual land reform 
 
The results of the present survey show that 20 projects are degenerating rather than 
developing and are making no income at all. Furthermore, many beneficiaries say 
they will not live on the farms, since the community gives them a supportive socio-
cultural and financial framework. The result is that farms are being left empty; five of 
those we investigated have already been abandoned and destroyed. This is particularly 
prevalent in SLAG projects, but applies to restitution projects as well. 
 
One possible solution to this trend is revising the structure of land reform in two 
complementary ways, in order to obtain a structurally renewed dual land reform 
combing the transfer of private and communal land. Firstly, rather than transferring 
land which is on average 29km (up to 100km) away from the beneficiaries’ original 
communities, land next to the communities should be transferred. This reduces the 
chance of land remaining empty for years. Secondly, to complement the LRAD 
programme, a second land programme focusing on communal farming (like the 
restitution and SLAG programmes) on land next to the communities should be 
implemented. 
 
Though this approach would not make individual projects any more inherently 
economically feasible, it would have several advantages. Firstly, it would make the 
land accessible by the majority of the beneficiaries, not only those who can afford 
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transport costs, and so promote use of the land. This would increase the impact, at 
least in terms of number of beneficiaries, of land reform projects. Secondly, the 
beneficiaries would not be separated from their socio-cultural contexts and would 
continue to benefit from their community life and self-help systems. Thirdly, such an 
approach would largely avoid the problems with basic infrastructure listed above. 
 
A potential problem of this approach is that it could create clusters of land around 
current settlements, and so perpetuate the biased geographical structures of the 
previous regime. To avoid this, the LRAD programme should be continued,21 since as 
a more commercially oriented programme LRAD focuses on target groups which are 
generally more mobile. This is also not without problems, however, since the results 
show that LRAD project are often also not feasible, due to economic issues such as 
the high price of land and high interest rates. 
 
Two policy measures are thus recommended, to renew the structure of land reform 
and help create a favourable environment for development. Firstly, for communal 
projects, instruments enabling territorial and geographical regulation are needed to 
facilitate the acquisition of land surrounding beneficiaries’ communities of origin. 
Such regulatory measures could focus on the initiating of land transactions 
(controlling financial issues), on land use (preventing the under-using of land) or on 
taxation of pluri-property owners. Secondly, for projects on privately owned land, 
mechanisms for improving the feasibility of commercial projects, such as land price 
controlling or interest lowering schemes, are necessary.  
 
2. Adapting institutional structures to avoid biased power 
relations and improve access to services 
 
As discussed above, inappropriate institutional structures can result when leadership is 
externally imposed, projects are structured according to inherited power structures and 
legal structures such as constitutions are not properly negotiated with all beneficiaries. 
These inappropriate structures can lead to mismanagement and misuse of resources 
and to discrepancies between the actual project and the legal entity that represents it. 
All these problems are accentuated by a lack of conflict resolution systems. 
 
Effective development requires a more transparent process of institution building. 
Firstly, leadership should not be appointed externally (especially not by a structure 
responsible for the monitoring of the process and development of the project). Leaders 
should be chosen through negotiations and compromises in an externally monitored 
process. Furthermore, through the same process, a managing committee and 
constitution should be constituted. These initial negotiations and compromises should 
give the project a more representative structure, quantitatively and qualitatively, 
leading subsequently to more sustainable development. 
 
In this process, conflict resolution systems should be developed. Such systems should 
include people, structures and/or institutions entirely external to the development 
process of the project. This conflict resolution system should be active throughout the 
project’s life cycle. 
                                                 
21
 Projects where LRAD grants are used to substitute SLAGs should in this case be avoided. 
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The structural renewal proposed for the land reform framework must follow and 
create a transparent process. In the envisioned land reform structure, community 
engagement is maintained, and can contribute to conflict resolution. Traditional power 
structures remain a powerful instrument for community control and conflict 
resolution. Also, since the redistributed land will be situated close to the communities, 
any person from the community will be able to form part of the management 
committee, rather than only those people with means, who automatically are those 
who traditionally have more power.  
 
3. Enhancing collective action 
 
The survey also noted distressing isolation of projects and lack of collective action. 
This contributes to poor cooperation between projects (e.g. sharing implements), lack 
of empowerment (e.g. access to marketing channels) and limited political action (e.g. 
obtaining government support). 
 
The main reasons for this lack of collective action are - aside from the absence of 
support systems - geographical isolation and diverse community attachments. The 
only two associations in the Mole-mole municipality exist among projects in close 
proximity. 
 
Gatherings should be organized by external support services/institutions to enhance 
interaction. This interaction could foster common interests and objectives, and lead to 
collective action (in a more or less structured form). To complement these efforts, the 
proposed restructuring of land reform will result in projects clustered around 
communities, which will enhance collective action. This structure will particularly 
help the poorest communities and households, who are hardest hit by institutional 
isolation. 
 
Collaboration with previous owners should also be promoted, possibly as part of a 
contractual agreement during the transfer phase within the land reform framework. 
 
4. Adapting institutional structures, including control and 
monitoring systems 
 
A final recommendation concerns the lack of an overall institutional structure, which 
should include control, monitoring and conflict resolution systems. Each project must 
be part of a structure at all levels and involving all stakeholders concerned with the 
land reform programmes, including all institutions, support services, administrative 
procedures, etc, from the beginning of the project and through its entire life cycle. 
 
Indeed, the success of land reform requires the interaction of all stakeholders. A 
coordinated, coherent institutional structure is necessary to enable this. Such a 
structure will optimise interaction, organization and coordination among all 
stakeholders. 
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This structure must include monitoring and controlling mechanisms. These must be 
the responsibility of external bodies and not, as currently, fulfilled by the same 
government body responsible for the implementation process. These external bodies, 
active at all levels among all stakeholders, should control, monitor and coordinate all 
the various activities of land reform. Such a governance structure should improve the 
ability to  
• identify weaknesses (such as administrative complexity, or lack of staff capacity), 
• avoid incoherence (between and within institutions and services) and 
• overcome the isolation from which many projects suffer. 
 
This overall structure for land reform must not follow a top-down autocratic pattern, 
but rather guide all stakeholders in their individual activities (e.g. adapting services, 
extending services) and in coordinating their activities.  
 
The restructuring recommended for the land reform process will promote the 
development of an integrated institutional framework. Adapting policy for communal 
and private land will facilitate service delivery at all levels (extension, marketing 
services, public works, etc.) while at the same time allowing for the specific needs 
(adapted extension services) of different socio-geographical areas. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
South Africa has only redistributed about 4% of its land to the previously 
disadvantaged (Lahiff, 2005). Due to the historical bias and the sensitive socio-
political character of land in South Africa, land reform must and will continue. 
However, land reform must also, without affecting overall production structures in 
any negative way, improve the livelihoods of the previously disadvantaged, mainly 
the rural poor. 
 
This report is based on research carried out in the Mole-mole municipality of the 
Limpopo Province on 39 land reform projects (including restitution, SLAG and 
LRAD projects). The results are definitive: land reform not only has negatively 
impacted production at municipality level, but is presently not improving livelihoods 
in rural South Africa. This study confirms, quantifies and analyses the failure of South 
Africa’s land reform restitution and redistribution programmes. 
 
Of the 39 projects assessed, only four seem likely to survive, and only three of these 
in a sustainable manner. Instead of improving the livelihoods of the approximately 
4691 beneficiary households, land reform currently only benefits 164 households, and 
has caused an 89.5% decrease in production as well as many job losses. Of the 
households currently benefiting from the land reform projects, only very few can 
effectively live on this income. Most activity on the farms is subsistence-oriented, and 
several projects have entirely collapsed. A last option is often to lease the land out, 
(sometimes to its previous owner). 
 
There are a number of reasons for these failures:  
• Firstly, the feasibility of the land reform projects is questionable. Difficult 
economic conditions (land prices, interest rates) make LRAD projects non-
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sustainable. High numbers of beneficiaries, unsuitable land and geographical 
isolation make restitution and SLAG projects unfeasible.  
• Secondly, inappropriate institutional structures at project level result in legal 
inconsistencies and power struggles, which cause conflict, mismanagement and 
misuse of resources.  
• Thirdly, a lack of collective action and institutional contact leads to sometimes 
extreme isolation of the land reform projects. 
• Finally, land reform processes are characterized by administrative complexity, 
lack of knowledge and skills among government personnel, and non-transparency. 
This destroys trust in the government programmes and prevents the provision of 
adapted, coordinated services. 
 
Solutions are required to overcome these failures and to improve the prognosis for 
upcoming land reform projects. This study recommends firstly that the structure of 
land reform be renewed in South Africa, to take a dual approach combining private 
and communal land. The first pillar of this approach will promote private land reform, 
based on the existing LRAD programme, and the second pillar restructure communal 
land reform along more territorial and geographical lines around existing rural 
communities. A second recommendation outlines institutional structures to be 
enhanced and made more transparent and participative. A third recommendation is 
that collective action be promoted to overcome project isolation. Lastly, this study 
recommends that a strong coherent institutional structure, including control and 
monitoring systems, be formulated to integrate land reform projects into a coordinated 
framework while adapting to each project’s individual needs. 
 
These recommendations should not be implemented separately as discussed above but 
should form a coherent framework. Furthermore, they are not quick-fixes for the 
problems facing land reform and development. Rather, these recommendations 
highlight some aspects that must be addressed if land reform in South Africa is to 
contribute to development and overall stability. 
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